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ABSTRACT 
 
“Profit expactancy” has become the driving motive in most of the human actions in our 
modern world. However the idea of unlimited consumption and profit gained by technological 
development have been challenged and limited by the unintentional social consequences of 
technological change and the risks that are inevitably tied to them. People are now aware of 
the pollution, environmental degradation, resource depletion and many other risks that come 
together with modern technologies. However, since the perceptions of every individual differ 
from one another, debates about a risk issue inevitably turn into conflicts. The purpose of this 
study is to analyse such a conflict that aroused in Bergama, Turkey due to the siting of a gold 
mine using cyanide in its production. This analysis is aimed to be made with the help of the 
conceptual tools of the social arena theory. Moreover, by employing an integrated study of the 
realist and constructivist approaches to risk, this particular social experience of risk is aimed 
to be studied for a more comprehensive analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords : Risk, risk perceptions, social arena theory and conflict resolution.  
 
 2
 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 5 
1.1 What is cyanide? .............................................................................................................. 6 
1.2 Importance of “Gold” for a developing country .............................................................. 7 
1.3 Motive and methodology.................................................................................................. 8 
1.4 Limitations of the study.................................................................................................. 11 
1.5 Other considerations....................................................................................................... 12 
1.6 Structure of the thesis ..................................................................................................... 12 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.......................................................... 14 
2.1 The concept of risk......................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 Other concepts related to risk......................................................................................... 15 
2.3 Realist approach to risk .................................................................................................. 18 
2.4 Constructivist approach to risk....................................................................................... 20 
2.4.1 “Weak” and “strong” constructivist perspectives ................................................... 21 
2.5 An integration................................................................................................................. 22 
2.6 The social arena of risk .................................................................................................. 25 
2.6.1 Risk arenas .............................................................................................................. 27 
2.6.2 Conflict resolution in a risk arena ........................................................................... 28 
2.7 How to approach the cyanide controversy of Bergama ................................................. 29 
3 THE ACTORS OF THE CYANIDE CONTROVERSY........................ 31 
3.1 The multinational gold mine .......................................................................................... 31 
3.2 The locals ....................................................................................................................... 32 
3.3 The government and the “Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey” 
(TUBITAK).......................................................................................................................... 32 
3.4 The local scientists and NGOs. ...................................................................................... 33 
3.5 International monetary fund (IMF) ................................................................................ 34 
3.6 Summary ........................................................................................................................ 35 
4 THE SOCIAL ARENA IN THE CYANIDE CONTROVERSY........... 36 
4.1 General overview of Turkey .......................................................................................... 39 
4.1.1 Agriculture .............................................................................................................. 39 
4.1.2 Mineral industry ...................................................................................................... 40 
4.1.3 Foreign direct investment........................................................................................ 41 
4.1.3.1 World Bank and IMF assistance .......................................................................... 43 
 3
4.2 Relevant information about the Turkish economy......................................................... 44 
4.3 Science and technology policy of Turkey ...................................................................... 47 
4.4 Environmental policy of Turkey .................................................................................... 51 
5 THE BERGAMA MOVEMENT AND THE CYANIDE 
CONTROVERSY.............................................................................................. 52 
6 DIVERGING RATIONALITIES ............................................................. 64 
7 CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 71 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 74 
APPENDIX ........................................................................................................ 77 
FIGURES .......................................................................................................................... 77 
Figure 1: Foreign direct investments of Turkey............................................................... 77 
Figure 2: Total debt to World Bank ................................................................................. 77 
Figure 3: Total debt to IMF.............................................................................................. 78 
MAP: Earthquake zones in Turkey ...................................................................................... 78 
CHARTS: ............................................................................................................................. 79 
Chart1) Cyanide in process water .................................................................................... 79 
Chart 2) Heavy metals in process water in 2001-2002 .................................................... 79 
Chart 3) Noise .................................................................................................................. 79 
Chart 4) Blasting .............................................................................................................. 80 
Chart 5) Particulate dust................................................................................................... 80 
Chart 6) Cyanide reality in Turkey .................................................................................. 80 
PICTURES: .......................................................................................................................... 81 
Picture1) Cyanide pollution in Lefke, Cyprus. ................................................................ 81 
Picture2) The INCO circuit that destroys free and weak acid dissociable cyanide. ........ 81 
Picture 3) Reaction of the local people ............................................................................ 81 
OTHER PICTURES OF THE MINE: ................................................................................. 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
When the commercial interests have become the main driving motive behind most of 
the human actions, the meaning of development has been modified and the world has been 
seperated according to economic criteria. Nowadays it is more important to know whether 
countries are (economically) “developed” or “less developed” than to know about their 
climate, their culture or their religion.  Even science and technology, which once served to the 
intellectual development of individuals, have become crucially important areas of economic 
activity. They have become the tools for an absolute domination in industry and in many other 
economic activities. 
The main concern regarding the supremacy of economics over all aspects, including 
the development of science and technology, has been that the present situation will inevitably 
cause irreparable damage to the environment. Having experienced quite an amount of 
catastrophic technological failures that result in environmental degradation, socities become 
more concerned and critical about the situation. The idea of unlimited consumption and profit 
gained by technological development have been challenged and limited by the unintentional 
social consequences of technological change and the risks that are inevitably tied to them. 
People now understand that technologies also generate environmental degradation, pollution 
and resource depletion.   
The most prevalent way societies explore the possibility of limiting technology has 
been through the study of risk (Winner; 1986). Risk studies gained importance when the 
concerns about the hazard potential of industrial activities increased drastically. Politicians 
and policy makers started to seek ways to regulate increasingly dominating technology to 
protect their citizens from natural and technological hazards. However, this is something 
difficult to achieve, since the arena in which discussions of risk take place is highly 
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politicized and value dependent. Mostly, powerful economic and social interests dominate the 
arena rather than objective assessments about the risk in question. Cultural factors also enter 
the arena in risk evaluation. When it comes to large-scale technologies and their threats to 
human health and to the environment, discussions about risk evaluation turn into conflicts that 
are difficult to resolve. 
In this thesis, I want to open up such a conflict. My main focus is a multinational gold 
mine in Bergama, Turkey. The use of cyanide in the extraction process of the mine has started 
a discussion about the risks to the environment and to the health of the locals in 1990s. Due to 
the differing views and perceptions of the related actors, these discussions never settled down. 
When the Turkish government surpassed a law and let the mine operate despite the contrary 
court decision, the discussion turned into a controversy. The locals started to feel ignored and 
lost their trust to the policy makers. The government, being supressed by the heavy economic 
and social problems, stuck to its decision. Meanwhile, the mine tried harder to communicate 
with the locals in order to convince them. However due to different values, perceptions and 
interests of the actors and the social and economic reasons I want to study in this thesis, the 
cyanide conflict has not been resolved. The purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to explore how 
the social experience of a physical cyanide risk turns into a conflict due to differing 
perceptions, social, economic and political conditions.    
 
1.1 What is cyanide? 
The term "cyanide" refers to numerous compounds, both natural and human-made, 
having the chemical group CN, that is, one atom of carbon and one atom of nitrogen. 
Hydrogen cyanide is a colorless gas or liquid with a faint, bitter almond odor. Sodium cyanide 
 6
(the processing chemical which mining companies use) is a colorless solid with a slight odor 
of bitter almonds (Drillbits&Tailings; 2000, Volume 5, Number 3)1. 
 Cyanide is the most popular chemical used by mining corporations to extract gold 
from the ore, despite the fact that leaks or spills of this chemical are extremely toxic to fish, 
plant life and human beings. Popular concern over this technique has focused on the lethal 
impact of cyanide. Short-term exposure to high levels of cyanide can cause coma and/or death 
within 30 minutes to 1 hour. The lethal dose for humans is 1-3 mg/kg of body weight. Long-
term exposure to sublethal doses causes irritation of the eyes, loss of appetite, headaches and 
dizziness, and damage to the nervous system and thyroid gland (Korte and Coulston; 1997). 
 Cyanide impacts fish at far lower concentrations. Concentrations as low as five 
micrograms per liter have been found to inhibit fish reproduction, and adverse impacts have 
been reported at levels of ten micrograms per liter.  
 
1.2 Importance of “Gold” for a developing country 
Gold, as a symbol of economic power, has fascinated human beings for thousands of 
years. It has always been the proof of power promising its owner a future as bright as its 
sunny color. It is the only metal that does not get destroyed or lost, even if it is exposed to 
fire. On the contrary its quality improves when it is made red-hot and its charming color and 
precious quality last forever. This may be the main reason why, for centuries, people rushed 
to it, dreamed about it, tried to posses it and used it to get anything they wanted.  
For a developing country such as Turkey2, every additional money added to the budget 
is welcomed. Struggling with many economic, social and political problems, the policy 
                                                 
1 Available in URL http://www..moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/5_03/vs.html 
2 Based on gross national income (GNI) per capita, every economy is classified either as low income (less than 
$755), middle income (subdivided into lower middle $756 – 2955 and upper middle $ 2956-9265), or high 
income (more than $9266). According to this criterion, Turkey is classified as a developing country with an 
upper-middle income. (www.worldbank.org) 
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makers are forced to rely on economic activity with quick returns and tend to ignore the 
environmental concerns. When considerable amount of gold (a total of 24 tons) was explored 
in Bergama region, it was seen as an economic issue rather than a possible environmental 
problem. The mine was expected to generate around $300 million during the time of 
operation. The total estimated benefit was $415 million to the local economy and $675 
million3 to the national economy.4 Moreover, the mine would provide a considerable amount 
of jobs to the local people. From a politician’s point of view, these were enough to let the 
mine operate. However the people living next to the mine were more concerned about their 
health and their environment. They were living on agriculture and the siting of the mine was a 
threat to their personal, social and economical future. They did not want to sacrifice their 
future due to profit oriented policies of the government. 
 
1.3 Motive and methodology  
The reasons of the local resistance to the gold mine in Bergama and the movement of 
people to change the existing policy have been argued in Turkey for more than a decade. The 
controversy about the issue is still not resolved. I find this situation more risky than any 
physical risks. If this controversy can not be resolved successfully, it can create more 
controversies and the policy makers will loose their credibility further. This is the main reason 
why I want to examine the way a “physical” risk is perceived by the actors of the Bergama 
case and why the debate between them turned into an unresolved conflict. This examination 
may help to understand the perceptions and the motives of the actors.  
The factors influencing these perceptions and trust given to other actors are also of 
great importance. Being originally graduated from “economics” discipline and having worked 
in a state institution that prepares financial policies of the banking sector in Turkey, I have 
                                                 
3 Nearly 2% of the total external debt credited by multilateral organizations (my calculation) 
4 see (www.ovacik-altin.com) 
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experienced the great influence of the “economy” in the decision making process. In this 
thesis, I am going to present the economic problems as the most important factor influencing 
policies including the technological ones. In accordance to my case study, I will also analyse 
how societies react to these decisions made by the policymakers on their behalf and how these 
issues turn into conflicts that are difficult to solve. Achieving this analysis and putting 
forward the possible reasons why a conflict has not been solved successfully, may contribute 
to a future STS5 study that will analyse the ways of solving a risk conflict where most of the 
actors are satisfied. Analysing the reasons of failure in a risk conflict may help to find a 
feasible and successful way to help the actors meet on a common ground.            
        
To achieve the above mentioned objective, I have examined relevant literature on risk 
and risk perception issues together with the literature on cyanide and its hazards to the 
environment. I have also looked at some documents and official reports of “Scientific and 
Technical Research Council of Turkey” (TUBITAK) that will be discussed in the following 
chapters and counter reports prepared by different NGOs6. As mentioned above, there are still 
ongoing debates about the Bergama case in Turkey. Various newspapers and web pages that 
are dealing with this subject have also been examined in addition to the academic and official 
literature.  
This case study also contains non-participant observation in the gold mine and 
interviews with the experts of the mine and the local people. This was the most important and 
interesting part of this study for me. Having read a lot of literature and documents about the 
subject and constructed my own “subjective” opinion about the continuing debate, I was 
looking forward to going to Bergama and seeing the source of this debate with my own eyes. 
It was frustrating for at first since I have only one contact person in Bergama  who kindly let 
                                                 
5 Science, Technology and Society 
6 Non Governmental Organizations 
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me stay with his family during my research. Living with a local family turned out to be a great 
gain for my study, since I had the chance of experiencing new ideas and learning new 
knowledge about the case that I have not thought of before. Luckily, my contact person was a 
recently retired state officer who used to have contact with the villagers living adjacent to the 
gold mine. It meant that I would not have trouble in finding some local villagers to interview. 
But I was not that lucky in finding someone from the gold mine to interview. So I decided to 
go to the entrance of the gold mine alone, without any contact person, and ask for permission 
to go inside and have a look.  
Contrary to my worries of not getting a permission, the personnel of the mine kindly 
invited me into the mine. I was able to conduct a face to face, semi-structured, recorded 
interview with the “Community Relations Officer and Trainer” of the mine. I was also 
permitted to conduct an informal group interview with four female workers who were being 
trained that time, but it turned out that they were trainees who were not working in the mine 
for the time being. My request of interviewing some workers on the job was not accepted due 
to security reasons, but since I managed to gather more information than I needed, it did not 
create any problems in the analysis. I was also given some documents and cd-roms about the 
operation of the mine and invited to a guided tour. I wore some security clothes and a helmet. 
The tour had to be quided and held in a company car due to security reasons, but I was 
permitted to get off the car in some stops and take some pictures to observe the method they 
are using in the mine.  
I left the mine with a positive impression and some more names from the “Executive 
Board” of the mine to interview and headed to the nearby villages. The interviews with the 
local people turned out to be more difficult than I thought eventhough I had a contact person. 
I went to two different villages nearest to the mine; Narlıca and Ovacık. The best way to find 
people who are willing to talk about any issue in Turkey  is to go to a “local cafe” where most 
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of the men of a village are gathered to talk, drink tea and play cards during the day. I did the 
same thing. It was more like a group interview with the local people who were mostly 
peasants. I only asked my research question and let the talk start. They were reluctant to talk 
about the issue at first, since “they were fed up with sharing their opinion and seeing that 
nothing is done”. But after a while, they started to tell me their opinions about the case which 
are mostly critical. They turned out to be too talkative and helpful. They also introduced me to 
a man who was a worker. 
 After the informal interviews with the locals, I left Bergama for one more interview 
with an executive board member of the mine. His office was in Izmir, a city that is two hours 
away from Bergama. I conducted a semi-structured, formal, recorded interview about the risk 
management system of the gold mine.  
 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
Since the “risk of cyanide” in Bergama has become a highly debated and manipulated 
technical, social, political and economic issue, it was difficult to find dependable, objective 
data and people to interview. Furthermore the data I found about the technique used in the 
mine was too technical for me to understand. For this reason, I did not try to show if the 
related mine using that technique should be closed or not. Rather, I would like to analyze the 
factors affecting the locals’ perception of the mine as a “risk”.    
Another thing that can be seen as a limitation to the study is the difficulty of getting 
honest answers from the peasants when talking as a group, since anyone having an opposite 
opinion may feel uncomfortable to express it due to group pressure. The same thing is also 
relevant for the workers who did not want to express any opinion about their working place 
since the peasants were majority in the group. However, in the archieves of various 
newspapers, I could find some interviews made by a number of peasants. This source of 
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information helped me solve this limiting problem. With this aditional source, I was able to 
get a broader picture about the perceptions of the peasants.          
 
1.5 Other considerations 
Ethical considerations and confidentiality are of major importance in my research. I 
assured the people I interviewed that the results of the research will be shared with them if 
they would like it and the name of the individuals will be kept confidential if requested. The 
manager and the community relations officer of the mine did not request confidentiality, 
however other workers interviewed inside and outside of the mine and the peasants wanted to 
be held confidential since “they did not want any trouble”. Due to this fact, all the names will 
be kept confidential unless they want their names used in any published document in the 
future. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
Following this introductory chapter, I am going to set up my theoretical framework in 
chapter two. I will first give some definitions of relevant risk concepts. In the second part of 
this chapter, I will demonstrate the way I will approach the “cyanide” controversy by 
integrating the realist and social constructivist approaches to understand the motives lying 
behind the risk perception of socities. Then I will establish the arena theory to open up an 
environmental conflict. In the third chapter, I will give information about the actors in the 
cyanide controversy of Bergama. The fourth chapter will set the stage of this controversy and 
clarify the rules of the arena. To set the stage, I will provide some background information of 
the arena, in this case of Turkey. Since the major actors of the case are the agrarian peasants 
and the gold mine, it will be useful to give information about the importance of the agriculture 
and the mineral industry in Turkish economy. In this part, I will also provide some economic 
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problems faced by Turkey when the cyanide controversy took place, since these problems 
were the main reasons affecting the relevant policies and the perceptions of the actors. This 
chapter will also provide the technological and environmental policies and related laws as the 
rules of the arena that limit the actions of the actors. The fifth chapter is the case study of 
Bergama. Here I will tell the story of “how the siting of the gold mine has turned into a 
conflict” . In the sixth chapter, the case will be analysed in the light of arena theory to 
examine the locals’ perception of risk and the reasons that are turning the issue into an 
unresolved conflict. The last chapter will provide a summary of the main arguments and the 
concluding points of this thesis.  
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 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In this chapter, I will concentrate on the concepts within science, technology and 
society studies (STS) that I find crucial to approach to the “risk” issue. First I will briefly 
define some relevant concepts that will be helpful in building a theoretical approach. Then I 
will demonstrate the way I will approach the “cyanide” controversy in Bergama. To achieve 
this demonstration, I will not use a specific theoretical approach since one theory alone can 
not provide a thorough and valid understanding of the social experience of risk. Socities do 
not label a technology as “risky” just by considering the knowledge they have about the 
possible physical consequences. As Ortwin Renn has also pointed out, the social experience 
of risk is shaped by a number of factors. The handling of risk information by individuals and 
social groups according to their values, the social and cultural meanings of risk causes and 
effects and the structural and organizational factors are as important as the knowledge about 
physical consequences of a risky technology (Renn; 1992b, 179). Analysis of the factors that 
affect people’s perceptions of risk necessiates an integration of different percpectives. For this 
reason, I will attempt to integrate different approaches to “risk” within the STS field to create 
a common network of linkages between them.  
The field of risk studies have stemmed from the practical needs of industrial societies 
to regulate increasingly dominating technology and to protect their citizens from natural and 
technological hazards. Technological failures such as Chernobyl, Bhopal, Seveso, Windscale7 
and many more have drawn the public attention to the hazard potential of industrial activities 
and the related risks to the human beings and their environment. For this reason, the study of 
risk has always been at the intersection point of academic, governmental and industrial 
interests (Krimsky and Golding; 1992). Numerous approaches to risk, both practical and 
                                                 
7 See Jasanoff(1994), van Eijndhoven(1994) and Wynn(1996b)  
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theoretical, have emerged in different research areas and academic disciplines (Luhmann; 
1991).   
 
2.1 The concept of risk    
The immediate controversy in “risk’’ related issues start to be felt as early as people 
attempt to define what a risk is. There is no commonly accepted definition for it neither in the 
sciences nor in public understanding. I am going to clarify these differing definitions when I 
deal with different approaches to risk. In this part I want to give a general view of what a risk 
is.  
In most contexts, risk refers to a danger of unwanted events and defined as the 
possibility of physical or social or financial harm/detriment/loss due to a hazard8 within a 
particular time frame (Renn et al; 2000, 14). Therefore, we can talk about two general aspects 
of risk; it involves some danger, harm or loss and it has an aspect of uncertainty. (Hogsnes; 
2001) 
Risks can be classified into two groups, as voluntary and involuntary, regarding the 
type of exposion. In voluntary risks, individuals can choose to be exposed to the related risk. 
Smoking and drinking alcohol can be some examples of this type. Involuntary risks, however, 
are risks which various groups are exposed to without any individual control. Environmental 
risks, for example, are involuntary since they are exposed by the society as a whole whether 
the individuals have a permission or control over the event or not.  
 
2.2 Other concepts related to risk 
After giving a general definition of risk, it is crucial to define risk related concepts 
such as risk assessment, risk management and risk perception. 
                                                 
8 Hazard is a broader concept than risk that incorporates the probability of the event happening and the impact or 
magnitude of the event on society and environment (Cutter, 1992) 
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 Risk assessment denotes the scientific process of defining the components and 
implications of a hazard in precise, usually quantitative terms (Rohrmann et al; 2000, 14). In 
technical risk assessment, this means calculating the probabilities for unwanted consequences. 
Risk management refers to the process of reducing risks (either the hazard itself or its 
consequences) to a level tolerable by the society and to assure control, monitoring and public 
communication (Morgan; 1990).  
Risk perception refers to people’s views on risks within the social sciences. People 
receive and process physical signals (such as witnessing an explosion), as well as information 
about possible outcomes of future human actions or natural events, and they tend to form 
respective opinions and attitutes towards risk sources and impacts (Rohrmann et al; 2000). 
Therefore in risk perception, people’s judgements and evaluations of hazards they (or their 
environment) are or might be exposed to is very important. Both experiences and beliefs have 
to be considered. Therefore, subjectivity and value dependency are integral parts in risk 
issues. 
 When the judgements and perceptions about any issue differ due to different values, 
the emergence of controversies among individuals is inevitable. In many societies, severe 
conflicts in evaluation of risk have emerged, especially with respect to large-scale 
technologies such as chemical industries and nuclear energy (Beck; 1992). The concerns of 
risks caused by human actions are peaked in risks to human health and to the environment. 
The assesment of such risks are considered to be very complex since there is a considerable 
gap between how experts think about risks and how non professional people judge and 
evaluate risks (Rohrmann et al; 2000). Furthermore, cultural factors are crucial for people’s 
risk evaluation. What criteria are appropriate for dealing with risks? Should context be 
important in dealing with risks or should society adopt a uniform criteria for it? Who should 
be involved in designing these criteria? The responses to these questions depend on the 
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perspectives of different actors in the socities (Bradbury; 1989). Thus societal decision 
making about risk issues has become more and more complicated (Renn et al; 2000).  
It would be easy to make a decision if we consider that the risk is seen by the society 
as an objective consequence of an event and calculated as the probability of well-defined 
adverse effects. Then, ordering risks according to “objective” magnitude of harm, and 
allocating resources to reduce the greatest risk first would be sufficient. If on the other hand 
we consider that risk is perceived as a cultural or social construction, risk management 
activities would be set according to different criteria, and priorities should reflect social 
values and lifestyle preferences (Renn; 1992a, 54).  
These two views represent two extremes in risk perspectives. And it is difficult in the 
real world to consider that risk is either perceived as totally objective or socially constructed. 
The pure objective realistic view of risk is not applicable and there is no single country in 
which uniform criteria for all risk types have been established. Not all types of risks are 
evaluated in the same manner. Definitely, there are times when some social considerations 
undermine the possibility of a physical harm. Similarly, the pure relativistic view of social 
constructivism is also difficult to justify since many nations have adopted very similar 
standards and risk reduction priorities despite major cultural and social differences. (Renn; 
1992a). Under these circumstances, these two perspectives must be integrated to complement 
eachother. Renn has mentioned that it has been the case and technical risk analysis has 
become complemented by social-science approaches in order to explain how individuals and 
socities at large socially construct their view on undesirable realities. (Renn et al; 2000, 17)   
In the following two sections, I will review these two extreme approaches, namely 
realist and constructivist. In fact it would be inappropriate to group or make a classification of 
different thoughts. As I mentioned above, no one can be considered as totally realist or 
constructivist. But my intent is to provide a conceptual distinction. Therefore I am going to 
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classify the approaches to risk according to their level of objectivity in risk perception. Then I 
will provide an integration of these two perspectives for a better approach to explain social 
responses to risk. 
 
2.3 Realist approach to risk 
 The realist approach involves a cognitive science perspective, which has developed 
and is expressed principally in technical and scientific approaches. Technical analyses of risk, 
emerging from fields such as engineering, statistics, psychology, epidemiology and 
economics, bring together the notion of danger or hazard with calculation of probability 
(Lupton; 1999). They define risk as the product of the probability and consequences of an 
adverse event (Bradbury; 1989).  
In this approach, therefore, risk is seen as an “objective” hazard, threat or danger that 
exists and can be measured independently of social and cultural processes. A potential 
physical harm to human beings or ecosystems is anticipated, it is avaraged over time and 
space and the probabilities are measured by using the relative frequencies. (Renn; 1992a) 
Since risk is seen as an objective phenomena, the perceptions regarding risk should 
not differ among individuals. As another scholar, Sheldon Krimsky, points out, this approach 
defines the “perceived’’ risk as the outcome measurement of the interaction of an individual 
with the external environment mediated through cognitive structure (Krimsky; 1992, 18). 
Therefore an event with a negative consequence is evaluated by the mind of the individual 
and should be perceived as risky by all the rational individuals. Since physical harm is 
perceived as an undesirable effect at least for most people and society as a whole, technical 
risk analyses can be used to avoid or modify the causes that lead to these unwanted effects. 
(Renn; 1992a, 59). These technical analyses can also be used to reduce conflicts that may 
emerge in health or environmental issues. Much of the realist literature adresses the perceived 
 18
reasons of such conflicts between scientific, industrial and government organizations and the 
public in relation to the health and environmental risks created by science, technology and 
industry. As Deborah Lupton  discusses: 
 
The public is traditionally described as having been concerned about environmental risks 
mostly over the past half century or so and as becoming more critical and challenging 
regarding the activities of industry and government. (Lupton; 1999,18)  
 
The literature on risk adressing this problem attempts to identify the social and 
psychological factors influencing greater public reaction and distrust to institutions and lay 
people’s assesment of risk with the objective to create an understanding between the public 
and the institutions. However, since the nature of risk is taken for granted, one important 
question has been ignored in this approach: How are risks constructed as social facts? 
This approach, therefore, tends to reduce the meanings and behaviours associated with 
risk perception and assessment to the individualistic level. Cognitive science does not 
generally take into account the symbolic meanings (created through the social world) that 
humans give to things and events. As Lupton further discusses, perception in realist 
perspectives is limited to how people see and understand the world through their senses and 
brain-functioning (Lupton; 1999, 22). People tend to be considered outside the cultural and 
political frameworks, relationships, and institutions within which they construct their beliefs 
and behaviours. Individuals are therefore represented as emotion-free actors, self-interested, 
ideally behaving in response to their carefully considered calculations of risk as it affects 
them individually. But is this really the case? 
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2.4 Constructivist approach to risk 
Realist approach is being criticized by sociocultural perspectives for neglecting the 
social and cultural context which risk is understood and negotiated. The constructivist 
approach involves these criticisms and is emerged from disciplines such as cultural 
anthropology, philosophy, sociology, social history, cultural geography and science and 
technology studies. (Lupton; 1999, 17). 
The knowledge about risk, according to this approach, depends on the sociocultural 
contexts in which this knowledge is created, whether in relation to scientists’ and other 
experts’ knowledges or lay people’s knowledges. Scientific knowledge or any other 
knowledge, according to this approach, is never value-free but rather is always the product of 
“a way of seeing”. As Lupton points out, a risk is not a static, objective phenomenon, but is 
constantly constructed and negotiated as part of the network of social interaction and the 
formation of meaning (Lupton; 1999, 29). Expert judgements of risk, rather than being the 
“objective” and “neutral” therefore “unbiased” assessments which are usually mentioned by 
the realist approach, are regarded as equally constructed by implicit and cultural processes as 
are lay people’s judgements. Risks are not seen as realities lying outside of society and 
culture, but as integration of meanings, logics and beliefs. We can only know and experience 
risks through our specific location in a particular sociocultural context. This approach to risk 
highlights the importance of the embeddedness of understandings and perceptions of risk, and 
emphasizes that these understandings and perceptions often differ between actors who are 
located in different social contexts. Renn expresses this difference between perspectives as: 
 
Issues such as health threats, inequities, fairness, control, and others can not be determined by 
“objective” scientific analysis but only reconstructed from the beliefs and rationalities of the 
various actors in society (Renn; 1992a, 71).  
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There are still differing debates among the constructivists about the nature of risk. In 
this point, for the sake of conceptual distinction, I will divide the constructivist approach into 
two perspectives according to their description of risk as Lupton did as “weak” and “strong” 
constructivist perspectives. (Lupton; 1999, 30)  
 
2.4.1 “Weak” and “strong” constructivist perspectives  
The weak social constructivist position sees risk as cultural mediations of “real 
dangers and hazards”. It is, therefore, objective but is inevitably mediated through social and 
cultural processes and can never been known in isolation from these processes. For the strong 
constructivists, by contrast, a “hazard” or “danger” itself is also seen as socially constructed 
and perceived as risk when human actors recognize and label it as such. Nothing is risk in 
itself, what we understand to be a ‘‘risk’’ is a product of historically, socially and politically 
constructed “ways of seeing it”. (Nielsen; 1996).  
Those who have adopted social constructivism, regardless of the strength of their 
position, tend to argue that a risk is never fully objective or knowable outside of belief 
systems and moral positions. If a “risk” is understood as a product of perception and cultural 
understanding, then to draw a distinction between “real” risks (as measured and identified by 
experts) and “false” risks (as perceived by members of public) is irrelevant. Both perspectives 
of the constructivist approach are describing forms of risks, and both lead to certain actions 
(Lupton; 1999). What is important is the way in which these descriptions are constructed and 
acted. The questions that might be asked about risk by the constructivist approach, therefore, 
are very different than the realist one: What statements are used to construct certain kinds of 
knowledges about risk at a particular moment and social setting?, How do new discourses on 
risk emerge, cause other discourses and what are the effects of this for risk knowledges and 
subjects of risk? , How is risk understood in different sociocultural contexts? The answers to 
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these questions lies both in the realist and constructivist perspectives in “real life” situations. 
Therefore, I find it more descriptive to integrate these two perspectives in order to analyse the 
social experience of risk in the cyanide case that is subject to this thesis.   
 
2.5 An integration 
An integration of two extreme approaches appears to be necessary for both the 
analysis of risk experience and prescription of risk policies. The social experience of risk 
includes the perception of actual damage, but it is more focused on the evaluation of the risk 
context and the associations between the risk and social or cultural artifacts. If all socities 
cared about was reducing the amount of physical harm done to its members, realist approach 
would be sufficient to explain risk perception. However, socities are not only concerned about 
risk minimization. Sometimes a financial compensation of a physical risk can change the 
perceptions of people and eliminate whatever risk they are perceiving. Harry Otway, another 
scholar who underlines the importance of social perspectives on risk in explaining these 
differences in perceptions argues that there may be times when people are willing to suffer 
harm if they feel it is justified or it serves other goals. At the same time they can reject even 
the slightest chance of being hurt if they feel the risk is imposed on them or violates their 
other attitutes and values (Otway et al; 1982). Therefore, an integration of realism and 
constructivism can provide a more productive approach in examinig the social experience of 
risk. 
Ulrich Beck is one of the scholars who has a similar approach. He proposes that 
realism and constructivism can very well complement eachother although their notions seem 
incompatible. Only by thinking risk in terms of reality, or a becoming-real (a virtuality) as 
Beck calls it, can social materialization be understood. Equally, only by thinking risk in terms 
of construction can we understand its indefinable ‘’essence’’ (Beck; 1999,136).  
 22
  Risks must clearly be brought into consciousness and made real to be perceived as an 
actual threat, and this includes cultural values and symbols as well as scientific arguments. 
‘’Real’’ consequences are always mediated through social interpretation and linked with 
group values and interests (Renn; 1992a). Risks, therefore, are at the same time real and 
constituted by social perception and construction. Beck adds to this point that their reality 
comes from ‘’impacts’’ that are created from ongoing industrial and scientific production. 
Knowledge about the risks, in contrast, is tied to the history and symbols of one’s culture and 
the social fabric of knowledge. This is one of the reasons why the same risk is perceived and 
handled politically so differently between different nations. (Beck; 1999, 143) 
Beck has also given a sociological analysis of the deep structure of risk apprehension 
that invades modern culture (Beck; 1986). In our times, industrial or nuclear risks create a 
lack of responsibility and compensation. According to Beck, modernization has been the 
creator of such risks that can not be controlled and compensated. He further argues that the 
risks of the old industrial society were limited and could be compensated for or insured 
against. The new technologies of the modern state are proved to be guilty and the gains of 
technical and economic progress can be ignored because of the nuclear, chemical, ecological 
and biotechnological risks they produce (Beck; 1992, 10). 
Aside from the physical consequences of modern technologies and their incontrollable 
nature, the perceptions of individuals are also affected by some social factors. Competence 
and trustworthiness of organizations or individuals, are among the essential parts of risk 
perceptions. Expert risk analyses usually misrepresent the open-ended, indeterminate nature 
of these factors and treat them as if they could be handled by statistical rules. They adopt 
models that assume social and organizational behaviour follows dependable laws. However 
this assumption is not valid in all of the risk situations. As Brian Wynne argues:  
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 “The imposition of basic risk meanings and models upon people by the experts and related 
institutions creates an objective social threat to those people and increases whatever risk they 
perceive” (Wynne; 1992a, 282). 
 
 This is an inevitable response caused by lack of critical reflexive awareness of the 
expert institutions. The social anxiety regarding a risk tends to be misinterpreted by experts as 
ignorance or irrationality. This enhances the public’s sense of being threatened by institutions 
that do not respect its identity and rationality which further enhances their sense of risk.  
It is also increasingly accepted that public understanding of science and public risk 
perceptions are not so much about public capabilities of understanding technical information, 
but about the trust and credibility they are prepared or forced to give to scientific experts or 
institutions (Wynne; 1992a). However this perspective is incomplete in the sense that trust 
and credibility reflect the nature of the social relationships between the actors concerned. 
Wynne argues that the best explanatory concepts for understanding public responses to 
scientific knowledge are not trust and credibility per se, but the relationships, networks and 
identities from which these are derived. These social identities are incomplete and open to 
continual (re)construction through negotiation of responses to social interventions such as the 
experts represented, therefore trust and credibility are dependent upon the nature of these 
evolving relationships.(Wynne; 1992a, 282)   
Controversies and conflicts start to emerge when people tend to feel more ‘insecure’ in 
their relationships with other social contexts such as experts. They start to ask how institutions 
that are supposed to manage risks can be trusted and risky activities be accepted although it is 
evident by past experience that they are the ones involved in putting people’s social identities 
at risk. Sometimes trust and credibility can also become the object of a ‘’deconstruction’’. 
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People may act as if they trust these institutions since they are dependent on them. However 
as Wynne points out, this trust is only skin deep (Wynne; 1992a).  
So far, I have focused on the approaches that study and explain risk perception. It is 
also crucial to look at how controversies and conflicts about risk issues are handled. At this 
point it will be useful to focus on another approach that deals with what seems to be missing 
in the above discussed approaches: the structural factors that shape interactions among social 
groups and influence the outcome of social conflicts over risk (Renn; 1992b). Therefore, I am 
going to use the social arena approach to risk to analyse the structural factors that turn risk 
issues into conflicts.  
 
2.6 The social arena of risk 
A social arena is a metaphor to describe the symbolic location of political actions that 
influence collective decisions or policies. The arenas describe the political actions of all social 
actors involved in a specific issue. These issues can be controversial political decisions such 
as siting of facilities that cause environmental degration. Since the perceptions of actors are 
mostly contradictory, these decisions usually turn into conflicts. Ortwin Renn is an important 
scholar who has worked on these conflicts and developed the social arena theory in risk 
issues. He argues that using the metaphor of an arena, social conflicts can be described as a 
struggle between various actors on the arena stage, controlled by a rule enforcement agency 
(usually a governmental institution) and observed by professional ‘’theater critics’’ (the 
media) who interpret the actions on the stage and transmit their reports to a larger audience 
(Renn; 1992b, 181). 
Many analyses of risk debates focus on the perception of risks of the various actors 
without acknowledging the social, political, or cultural context within which the risk debate 
takes place. The arena metaphor, on the other hand, focuses on both the structural rules of the 
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arena and the perceptions of the actors (Otway et al; 1982). This is the reason why I want to 
use the arena theory in my analysis of a social conflict regarding an environmental risk.  
The actors are among the most important elements in an arena. The center stage of an 
arena where the debate takes place is occupied by the principal actors. These actors seek to 
influence policies by their actions. Another important element in an arena is the set of rules 
that are limiting the actions of the actors. These rules are classified by Renn as formal and 
informal; formal rules are coded and monitored by a rule enforcement agency and informal 
rules are learned and developed in the process of interactions among actors. Formal rules are 
laws, acts and mandated procedures and informal rules are regulatory styles, political climate 
of group interactions and role expectations (Renn; 1992b, 182).  
The basic claim of this approach is that social groups in a political arena try to 
maximize their opportunity within a given set of rules to influence the outcome of the 
collective decision process by mobilizing social resources. These resources can be money, 
power, social influence, value commitment and evidence. They may be used to gain attention 
and support of the general public, to influence the arena rules, and to become superior to other 
actors. Renn describes these resources and argues that: 
 
Money provides incentives (or compensation) for gaining support; power is the legally 
attributed right given to any actor and is used to impose a decision on others; social influence 
produces a social commitment to the issue at hand in order to find support through solidarity; 
value commitment induces support through persuasion and trust; and evidence can be used to 
convince people.  (Renn,1992b, 184).  
 
The more resources a group can mobilize in an arena, the more likely it is that it 
dominates the conflict resolution process and gets its point of view incorporated in the final 
decision (Dietz et al; 1989). Resource availabilty determines the degree of influence for 
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shaping policies. The more powerful actor is usually the one who dominates the arena and 
influences the final decision making.  
To sum up, this approach focuses more on the ability of the actors to mobilize 
resources. Conflicts in an arena are certainly grounded in differences between goals, values 
and interests. Whether the true motives of the actors can be measured is an open question. 
However, since no inference about the actor’s intentions or motivations has been made, there 
is no need to answer this question (Renn, 1992c).  
 
2.6.1 Risk arenas 
Risk arenas operate under similar structural rules like any other arena. All social 
groups feeling that their interests or values are affected by a specific risk source may be 
compelled to enter the arena. Their success depends on their ability to mobilize resources.  
Most risk debates center around three themes ( Renn1992c; Rayner et al 1987): 
- factual evidence and probabilities; 
- institutional performance, expertise and experience; 
- conflicts about world views and value systems. 
If the debate is created due to factual arguments about risk probabilities and the extent 
of potential damage, which is the first level, the problem may be the lack of technical 
knowledge on the part of the public. In this case, informing the public with expert opinions 
can solve the problem. Therefore, participation is equivalent to successful 
riskbcommunication. However it is rare in real conflicts. (Renn; 1992c) 
A more intense type of debate is about institutional competence to deal with risks. 
This type of debate does not rely on technical expertise, although reducing scientific 
uncertainity may help. The emphasis on personal and institutional judgements and experience 
requires more than risk communication; it needs input from stakeholder groups and affected 
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populations. Approval in this situation is gained by showing that the risk management 
institution has been competent, effective, and open to public demands. (Renn; 1992c) 
The most complex level of conflict is defined along different social values, cultural 
life styles, and their impact on risk management. In this case, neither technical expertise nor 
institutional opennes are adequate conditions for public approval. Decision making here 
requires a fundamental consensus on the issues underlying the risk debate. (Renn; 1992c) 
 
2.6.2 Conflict resolution in a risk arena 
The nature of the conflict resolution methods should vary depending on which level 
the risk debate takes place. If the value issues are not resolved, even the best technical 
expertise can not overcome social, cultural and political conflicts.  
There is a strong tendency for risk management agencies to re-frame higher level of 
conflicts into lower level ones. This is an attempt to focus the discussion on technical 
evidence, in which the agency is fluent (Dietz et al, 1989). The society is considered to be 
incapable of understanding technical information and therefore the experts try to bring the 
discussion in a level that they can handle. However this causes a further loss of trust towards 
the institutions and experts. This situation has been acknowledged by Renn. He argued that 
citizens who participate in the discourse are forced to use first level (factual) arguments to 
rationilize their value concerns. Unfortunately this is often misunderstood by risk managers as 
‘’irrationality’’of the public. Frustrated, the public retreats to due process and routinization of 
the process and departs with disillusion and distrust of the system (Renn;1992c, 9). 
To avoid this detoriation in public trust and to have a successful resolution of a 
conflict, the actual level of debate has to be established. Once it is established, an interactive 
method for resolving the conflict needs to be organized and structured. The participation of 
public represantatives may be helpful and crucial however it is not very likely. Procedures of 
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mediation, negotiation and arbitration have gained more and more popularity in many 
countries as a means to incorporate public concerns into decision process without sacrificing 
technical expertise or rational reasoning. Renn gives these procedures as tools for a successful 
conflict resolution and clarifies them. He argues that in negotiation, parties are invited to 
communicate with eachother and to design potential compromises on their own. In mediation, 
however, a mediator is needed to design the compromises for the parties. Finally in 
arbitration, parties are invited to exchange arguments and try to convince the arbiter that their 
view point is correct. These forms of conflict resolution can also be combined for a successful 
conflict resolution.  
He further argues that the conflict is admitted to be solved successfully if the objective 
of the conflict resolution process was accomplished at the end, and if all participants are 
satisfied with the outcome and the process itself. (Renn; 1992c,11) 
 
2.7 How to approach the cyanide controversy of Bergama 
This study analyses the social experience of risk when a chemical plant is sited in 
Bergama, Turkey and examines if the conflict that evolved accordingly is resolved 
successfully. The knowledge of possible physical consequences of the cyanide-using gold 
mine, the handling of risk information by individuals and social groups in Bergama, the 
socially constructed and differing risk perceptions and the structural and organizational 
factors can be better analysed by integrating the realist and constructivist approaches to risk. 
My analysis of the Bergama case will also integrate the social, political, economical and 
cultural factors that affected the credibility and trustworthiness of related actors and caused a 
controversy between different actors. Therefore, to open up the controversy, I will use the 
social arena approach to risk issues. I will first give information about the relevant actors in 
the cyanide controversy, then I will introduce the arena and its rules. Since Turkey is the main 
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arena of the cyanide controversy in Bergama, some relevant background information is 
needed to set up the stage. The main actors of the controversy are the peasants living on small 
scale agriculture and the multinational mining company. Therefore, I will give some 
background information about the importance of agriculture and the mineral industry. The 
limiting rules of the arena are also of great importance. In this case, they are the laws 
regulating the foreign investments and the policies concerning the technology and 
environment. In this respect, I will give some information about the arbitration law regulating 
the foreign investments in Turkey and the policies regarding the technology and environment. 
Since the economic conditions of Turkey in 1990s have affected the decisions of policy 
makers, it is also crucial to look at these conditions for a better analysis of the conflict. After 
setting the stage by giving the relevant background information about Turkey, I will tell the 
story of Bergama. In the end, I will demonstrate whether the conflict has been resolved in a 
successful way.    
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3 THE ACTORS OF THE CYANIDE CONTROVERSY 
 
The siting of a gold mine in Bergama, Turkey has turned into a national debate in 
1990s. The risks involved in the extraction process of the mine caused the debate turn into a 
highly discussed conflict. In about 15 years, many voices and opinions have been heard about 
the issue and the controversy could never be settled down. Although the voices have been 
lowered by the final decision of the Turkish government of the time, the conflict had not been 
resolved, it even got worse. The details about the issue will be given in the following chapters. 
In this chapter, I will briefly identify the actors that took part in the Bergama conflict.  
The actors who are central in the Bergama controversy from 1989 to 2004 are a 
multinational gold mining company, the peasants of nearby villages and local people of 
Bergama, some NGOs, local scientists, the government and Scientific and Technical Research 
Council (TUBITAK). International Monetary Fund (IMF) also has a peripheral role in 
influencing the decision made by the government. Furthermore the media has been closely 
involved in the debate by their uptodate coverage of the issue. 
 
3.1 The multinational gold mine 
Ovacik Gold Mine was owned by Eurogold Mining Ltd. when it first came to 
Bergama in 1989 for gold exploration. It was founded in August 1989 and jointly owned by 
Normandy Poseidon (Australian) and Metal Mining (Canadian) Corporations. In 1999, 
Normandy had bought the shares of the other partners and changed the name of the company 
to Normandy Mining Ltd. In 2002, Normandy was bought by the biggest gold producer 
company of the world, namely Newmont Mining Corp. This American company has a total 
gold reserve of 2840 tons and 23 gold mines in 10 different countries.9 In August 2004, due to 
                                                 
9 URL www.newmont.com/en/about/history/index.asp 
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the conflicts and the reaction of the locals, Newmont Normandy Mining Ltd. announced that 
the company could not be productive as anticipated and Ovacik Gold Mine was sold to the 
Canadian Frontier Pacific Ltd. for $45 million that is one third of the total investment done by 
the former owner.  
 
3.2 The locals 
The locals are the central actors in the cyanide conflict. There are 17 villages located 
in the 10 km radius of the Ovacik Mine. The mine is immediately adjacent to Ovacik village, 
with a population of 350 people. The next closest villages are Camkoy and Narlica with a 
total population of 1000. The surrounding villagers are highly dependent on small-scale 
agriculture and mostly grow tobacco, cotton and olives. There is also a touristic town called 
Bergama with a population of 50000 located 9 km. away from the mine.   
 
3.3 The government and the “Scientific and Technical Research Council of 
Turkey” (TUBITAK) 
The Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) is a 
governmental organization that was established in 1963. The main purposes of the council are 
to determine the science and technology policies of Turkey and to organize, coordinate and 
promote basic and applied research in line with the national targets of economic development 
and technical progress.10
The cyanide conflict that started with the siting of the gold mine was peaked with a 
principal decision given by the 57th Government of Turkish Republic. The Cabinet of the 
time, comprising a coalition of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party 
(ANAP) and the National Movement Party (MHP) decided that Normandy Mining Company 
                                                 
10 URL www.tubitak.org.tr 
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could operate its mine due to a report requested from TUBITAK. The experts who prepared 
the report had concluded that Normandy had taken every kind of precaution to prevent 
cyanide used in the extraction process from damaging the environment. 
 
3.4 The local scientists and NGOs. 
Some local and international scientists have entered the cyanide debate by providing 
information to the local people about the possible hazards of cyanide. They came to the region 
to inform the people about their previous findings about other gold mines using cyanide 
throughout the world, and their findings were not confronting. 
 A scientific symposium on the subject of the proven consequences of the planned 
gold extraction (using cyanide) in Turkey took place at the Technical University of Istanbul 
by the initiation of the Dean of the Faculty of Mining Sciences, Prof. Dr. Eskikaya. More than 
50 scientists from Turkey and Germany discussed the issue and presented their arguments in 
open debate for two days. In the final panel discussion of the symposium, the members of the 
panel concluded unanimously in Pergamon Declaration: 
 
"Based on current evidence, including the technologies involved and a knowledge of the 
natural and cultural environment, the planned extraction of gold in the Bergama region is not 
acceptable.” 11
 
There were also two NGOs that entered the debate when the government let the mine 
operate despite the court ruling. These NGOs were the Turkish Engineers and Architects 
Chamber Association (TMMOB) and the Association of Turkish Doctors (TTB). 
                                                 
11 Symposium named as “Scientific Aspects of Gold Extraction Using Cyanide”, June 26 – 27 1997. For more 
information see http://www.infu.uni-dortmund.de/korte-goldmining/index2.html 
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TMMOB was established in 1954 to represent the Turkish engineers and the architects 
and to help them share their professional knowledge and use it for the benefit of the society. 
There are more than 220.000 members of the organization who are graduates of Engineering, 
Architecture and City Planning.12
TTB was established in 1953 to protect and improve the state of public health, to try to 
provide the patients a first quality service with minimum cost and to protect the morals 
concerning health issues. 80% of Turkish doctors are the members of this association.  
 Both of these NGOs have reacted to the report prepared by TUBITAK. They have 
prepared a counter report, criticizing the remarks of the Assessment Report of TUBITAK. 
These reports will be discussed in the fifth chapter in more detail.  
 
3.5 International monetary fund (IMF) 
The IMF was established in the post-World War 2 era to stabilize monetary conditions 
of industrialized countries by providing “short term” financing to member states to enable 
them to correct temporary payment difficulties. (Vajpeyi; 1995)  
During 1970s and 1980s, the scope and nature of the fund started to change. Since 
then, most of its advice and all of its credit have gone to the Third World Countries. 
IMF is not a main actor in the cyanide conflict of Bergama. However, it had an 
influence in the government’s final decision. To secure an additional IMF loan agreement 
when the Turkey was hit by a devastating earthquake in 1999 and suffering from a severe 
economic crisis, International Arbitration Law was passed in the Parliament. This law is going 
to be clarified in the following chapter, however it is worth stating that this law was also 
highly debated since it was seen as a challenge to the national sovereignity and environmental 
protection.  
                                                 
12 URL www.tmmob.org.tr 
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 3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I have introduced the actors whose actions in a “risk” conflict will be 
analysed in the following chapters. I have only given very general information about every 
actor. More information concerning their motives, their perceptions, their movements and 
their relations with eachother will be provided in the following chapters. This chapter gives 
background information for a better analysis of the conflict arouse between the actors of the 
arena. Before moving on to the analysis of my case study, I will set the stage in the next 
chapter, provide the economic, social and political situation of the time that affected the 
perceptions of every actor and present the arena that all the actors struggle.  
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4 THE SOCIAL ARENA IN THE CYANIDE CONTROVERSY 
 
Under relentless economic and political pressures, the policymakers especially in the 
developing countries are often in conflict with the increasing demands to satisfy basic human 
needs like clean air, water, education, employment and satisfactory environmental quality. 
With the scarce economic and technical resources at their disposal, most of these 
policymakers have ignored long-term environmental concerns and aimed short-run economic 
and political gains (Vajpeyi; 1995). Frequently projects undertaken to improve economic 
conditions were the direct or indirect causes of environmental damage and dept repayments 
taken from international aid institutions aggrevated the situation more (Taylor et al; 1992). 
The net results are political and economic instability and enormous pressure to rely on 
economic activity that offers quick returns rather than attending to longer term needs through 
environmentally sensitive development. Inevitably, natural resources as capital assets are 
highly vulnerable to this kind of pressure. 
Less developed countries like Turkey wish to develop, to exploit their resources 
further. But important question here is not whether, but how they do so. Who will benefit 
from an intensification of economic activity and who can contribute to make that development 
sustainable? So far, the richer nations have played an important role in “Third World” 
development, not just because of the general constraints of the international economic system 
but through the particular actions of many private, often transnational, enterprises. (Taylor et 
al; 1992) 
Shifting dirty technologies that have been banned or limited in Europe and North 
America to the developing countries where environmental regulations are loose or non-
existent has become a common practice. Ann Taylor, an English politician, has admitted this 
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scenerio and put forward that, in 1980, The Brundtland Comission13 had reported that, the 
total of Third World exports to the OECD countries would have cost over $14 billion more if 
their production had been subjected to American standards of pollution control. (Taylor et al; 
1992, 55)  
This indicates the kind of “savings” to be made by locating industry in 
environmentally unregulated areas which are invariably eager to encourage foreign 
investment. There are thus overwhelming arguments for assisting developing countries with 
the help of multinational companies, financially and technologically, towards greater 
development at less environmental cost. Yet present trends are not very promising. World 
trade, for example, is organized in a way that clearly favours the industrialized nations.  
Foreign investment, on the other hand, is much more politically sensitive issue than 
trade since it essentially means exercising control over ownership of national assets and 
resources. In the post-war period, regulations were imposed on foreign investment due to past 
experiences where foreign firms not only took part in restrictive and predatory business 
practices but also interfered in the domestic political affairs of the host countries.14  
When a foreign investor enters a host country, it is supposed to follow the regulatory 
measures of that country.  Several countries have devised special measures for foreign 
investors (both negative and positive) to distinguish between the foreign and domestic 
investors. The discriminatory forms of regulatory measures on foreign investment differ in 
every country. For instance host countries often impose pre-admission regulations on foreign 
investment such as not allowing them in certain sectors of economy (for instance 
telecommunications, media, atomic energy), and putting general and sectoral equity limits on 
foreign investment. Concerned with sovereignity issues, the rationale behind pre-admission 
                                                 
13 In 1983, the Norwegian government, recognizing the increasing rate of environmental destruction, particularly 
in developing countries, decided to take action and suggested to the UN for a new commission to assess the state 
of the world’s environment and to examine the efficiency of the UN system in dealing with the ecological 
situation 
14 URL (www.aprnet.org) 
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regulations is to ensure that foreign investors do not control productive and stratagic sectors 
of the economy. However it is important to stress here that the pre-admission regulatations are 
not usually confined to the developing and the under-developed countries 
In Turkey, for example, almost all areas open to the Turkish private sector is also fully 
open to foreign participation. Foreign investments receive national treatment. The Treasury 
Undersecretariat screens foreign investment proposals, but this appears to be a routine and 
non-discriminatory process which does not impede investment or limit competition. Foreign 
shareholders are only restricted to 20% in broadcasting and 49% in aviation, telecom services 
and maritime transportation. In other sectors, 100% foreign ownership is permitted.  
Foreign Direct Investments and the measures taken to regulate, in Turkish case to 
encourage them due to internal and external pressures that we are going to analyze in this 
chapter, are of primary importance in our case since one of the important actors of this case 
study is a foreign investment with a “risky technology”.   
To get a better understanding of the case I am going to analyze in the next chapter, it is 
important to give a general picture of Turkey first. It is crucial to see how the relentless 
economic, social and political conditions of a country affect the policies, in this case 
technological policies, taken by the policy makers and change the public perception of 
countability on the authorities and technocrats in a negative way. With this purpose, I am 
going to give general information about Turkey. Then I will concentrate more on the 
economic conditions of the time and the technological and environmental policies of Turkey 
when these policies started to change with the internal and external pressures towards more 
profit oriented aims. 
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4.1 General overview of Turkey 
 
Turkey is a strategically located country between Europe and Asia with borders to 
Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Georgia, Armenia and Nahcıvan. It has a total land area of 
774.815 square kilometers. The population is nearly 70 million with a 1.7% growth rate. Over 
73% of its 70 million people live in urban areas. Agriculture accounts for some 13% of its 
GDP15, industry for 25.4%, and the services for 61.6%.  16  
General Information about Turkey17
 1995       2002 
Population(millions) 
 
 61.7        69.5 
Poverty (% of population below $1 a day)   -              2.0 
Adult literacy rate (% of total population) 
 
  81.8       86.0 
Urban population(% of total population) 
 
  63.7       66.6 
GNI per capita (PPP,$) 
 
 5300      6120 
GDP Growth (1990-95 and 1995-2002,%) 
 
    3.2         2.0 
Scientists and engineers in R&D (per mill.people) 
 
261.6       305.5 
Expenditures for R&D (% of GDP) 
 
    -             0.6 
 
4.1.1 Agriculture 
Agriculture is an important sector in Turkey’s agenda. The importance of it for this 
thesis is also undeniable, since the main actors of the controversy that is subject to this thesis 
are peasants who are living on small-scale agriculture. Therefore, a minor change in the 
agricultural situation of the country will cause a major change in peasant’s perceptions about 
                                                 
15 Gross Domestic Product 
16 URL, (www.worldbank.org), as of 2002. 
17 Sources: Country background information, UNESCO and World Bank (available at URL 
www.worldbank.org) 
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the case. It is, therefore, crucial to give some information about the present situation of the 
sector before analyzing the case. 
Turkey has an export oriented agriculture sector and is largely self-sufficient. Of the 
available land, 32% is considered arable, 4% is occupied by permanent crops and 16% is used 
for permanent pastures. The climate is temperate with hot and dry summers and mild winters, 
allowing agriculture to florish. Crops constitute 55% of the agricultural sector, livestock 
represents 34% and the remainder is split between forestry and aqua-culture. Key agricultural 
crops include wheat, pulses, cotton, citrus, tobacco, olive and sugar beets.  
Historically, the agriculture sector has been the largest employer to the Turkish 
economy. However as Turkey diversified economically, agriculture has declined in 
importance as a result of rapid industry and service sector growth. The contribution of it to 
GDP has declined accordingly to 13% (in 2002) from 22.7% (in 1982) over years. 
Exports of agricultural commodities accounted for 8.3% of Turkey’s total export 
earnings in 2000 and were valued at $2.2billion. Turkish exports of agri-food products totaled 
$3.9 billion. Turkey continues to diversify its agri-food exports through the development of 
processing technologies.18  
4.1.2 Mineral industry 
Since one of the main actors of the controversy that is subject to this thesis is a foreign 
mining investment, it will be helpful to give some information about the mineral industry and 
the foreign investment policies of Turkey.  
The geology of Turkey is extremely complex and is reflected in the diversity of its 
mineral deposits. Best known for its industrial minerals, Turkey is a major producer of refined 
borates and related chemicals, cement, ceramics and glass. A wide variety of primary metallic 
                                                 
18 URL, (www.worldbank.org) 
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minerals are produced as well, but output generally was not considered large according to 
world standards (Mobbs; 1996). The primary mineral sectors contribution to the economy 
traditionally has been slightly more than 1% of the gross domestic product (GDP). It was 
estimated that value-added secondary mineral commodities, including refined petroleum 
products, steel, cement, glass, and certain inorganic chemicals, accounted about 70% of the 
value of the nation’s manufacturing output. Total (primary and secondary) mineral industry 
revenues were estimated to be about 15% of GDP (Mobbs; 1996). Capacity expansion 
projects are continuing at many secondary mineral production facilities. Most mineral 
exploration by international companies are for gold, copper and zinc (Mobbs; 1996).  
4.1.3 Foreign direct investment 
 
The flow of foreign capital into Turkey since it became a republic in 1923 can be 
considered in two periods. Between 1923 and 1950, existing operations of foreign capital 
were nationalized and no foreign capital was allowed into Turkey (Ural; 1987). After 1950s, 
foreign capital was seen as an important element in economic development, and some legal 
and administrative measures for attracting foreign capital were taken. Law 6224 for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Capital was passed in 1954. It was focusing more on the technical 
aspects of foreign private investment like the importation of foreign capital, the transfer of 
profits, etc. but the social and economic effects of investment were never mentioned.  
The number of foreign investments increased in number after 1980s with the changes 
in financial policies of the country and the adoption of liberal and flexible foreign investment 
policies implemented by governments. (See Figure 1) 
In 1990s, Turkey has taken part in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
negotiations among OECD countries, and declared itself, with some reservations, to be ready 
to adopt it so as to attract more foreign investment (Treasury Undersecretariat; 1998). It was 
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in mid-1999 that Turkish government (including the President) and representatives of 
business began highlighting the necessity for the inclusion of the principle of international 
arbitration for investments into national legislation for further liberalisation, deregulation and 
restructuring of the economy, and thereby for foreign investment inflows19. A few months 
later the Turkish Parliament passed three constitutional amendments20 in a difficult procedure 
that needs a two-thirds majority in a Parliament with 550 seats (Coban; 2002). The arbitration 
law adopted the arbitration method only for disputes arising from public service concession 
contracts and conditions between the Turkish state and the investor. Before the new law, 
administrative courts and the Council of State were seen as the mechanisms to be followed for 
the resolution of disputes between the state and the investor. The new legislation had, 
however, adopted arbitration proceedings functioning outside the jurisdiction of 
administrative law. Following these developments was the passing of the International 
Arbitration Law21 in Parliament. This law extended the scope of arbitration (which has 
become the settlement method not just for concession disputes but for any dispute the parties 
of which accept arbitration as the means of dispute settlement) (Coban; 2002). Although these 
laws are seen as a challenge to national sovereignty and environmental protection by a serious 
number of people in the Turkish society, trade unions, professional chambers and 
environmental organizations since national laws are being bypassed to protect the rights of 
capital, they are seen crucial by some international aid agencies (namely International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank) for the economic development of the country.22 
These laws were passed to smooth the way for an additional IMF loan agreement when the 
country was hit by a devastating earthquake in 1999 and suffering from a severe economic 
crisis. The economic conditions of the time are going to be analyzed in the following sections 
                                                 
19 See Cumhuriyet daily, 28/5/1999; 2/6/1999; 7/7/1999; Milliyet daily, 4/6/1999; Hurriyet daily, 7/6/1999).  
20 Law no. 4446, 13/8/1999 
21 International Arbitration Law No. 4686, 21/6/2001  
22 URL (www.worldbank.org) 
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deeply but it may be helpful to clarify the relations of Turkey with World Bank and IMF since 
these institutions affect the way policymakers’ decisions about both financial and 
technological policies.   
 
4.1.3.1 World Bank and IMF assistance 
Turkey joined the World Bank in 1947. Since then, the Bank has assisted the 
Government of Turkey in overcoming a series of economic crises, and setting the country on 
a path of sustained and steady economic development, as well as improving the living 
conditions of its people. It supports Turkey’s reform program with an extensive lending (See 
Figure2) and technical assistance together with analytical and policy “advice”23. As of 2003, 
there are 16 ongoing projects with a total cost of 4.820 million USD. 
The World Bank is known to have the most advanced environmental policy and 
practices of any aid organization. Although environmental concerns were not serious issues in 
its early years, not only for the World Bank but even for the United Nations, the Bank’s 
activities and mission have been redirected and changed since 1970. However, the Bank is 
still being criticised for overvaluing the economic development and ignoring the 
environmental protection in its projects. Although the Bank may not have such an intent, it 
broadly defines “environment” due to economic priorities. This leaves a room to give a 
priority to development despite the environmental concerns. This criticism has also been 
acknowledged by a scholar, Dhirendra Vajpeyi, as: 
   
Despite the environmental commitment of the World Bank, there still remain many practical 
obstacles in implementing these policies. And the Bank’s definition of environment has been 
                                                 
23 URL (www.worldbank.org) 
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too broad to have enough room to dodge the real issues related to environment. (Vajpeyi; 
1995, 25)  
 
Another organization that Turkey has loan agreements with is IMF. It has been a 
member of IMF since March 11, 1947 and as of August 2004, the total amount credited by the 
IMF is 10.1 billion USD (See Figure 3). With respect to environment, IMF is also being 
criticized of having minimal role in environmental issues and setting the priority as economic 
development (Vajpeyi; 1995). 
 
4.2 Relevant information about the Turkish economy  
The most important factor encouraging the “short-term profit oriented” changes in 
most of the policies (including the technological ones) is the economic climate of the country 
especially in mid 90s. The unfavorable economic conditions of the time have negatively 
affected the decisions of the government in many issues. In our case for example, they made 
the government ignore the environment in favor of a profitable multinational company 
although the local people were strongly opposing. This case is going to be discussed in the 
next chapter. In this section, I am going to present the economic conditions of the time since it 
is crucial to give a rough picture of 90s in order to understand the case and the attitude of 
Turkish government. 
Turkey's dynamic economy is a complex mixture of modern industry and commerce 
along with traditional agriculture that still accounts for nearly 40% of employment. It has a 
strong and rapidly growing private sector, yet the state still plays a major role in basic 
industry, banking, transport and communication.24  
                                                 
24 URL (www.geographic.org) 
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Over the past 30 years, Turkey has been fighting with unstable economic and political 
conditions. It has been governed by 22 governments as high and persistent inflation became a 
major feature of the Turkish economy (Kibritçioğlu; 2004). 
Turkey experienced a short period of high inflation in the late 50s but the history of 
today’s high and persistent inflation goes back to the first half of the 70s at the earliest.  
Until the end of the 1970s, successive Turkish governments pursued an import-
substituting, inward-oriented industrialization strategy. However oil-price shocks in the 1970s 
and related balance-of-payments problems contributed substantially to a deep economic 
recession and a political and social crisis in Turkey. In early 1980, Turkey abandoned its 
inward-oriented development strategy and gradually started to introduce free market based 
reforms. After the introduction of the liberalization program in January 1980, the government 
was able to lower consumer prices from 140 percent in May 1980 to 33 percent and accelerate 
economic growth in the following four years (Kibritçioğlu; 2004). In May 1981, the 
government took the first step from fixed to a managed floating exchange-rate system. The 
change in the deficit financing method of the public sector from money to bond-finance 
started in 1986, and attempts to stabilize the exchange rate to prevent the inflationary effects 
of rising exchange rates made this policy combination unsustainable within a short period of 
time. An “exchange rate” crisis inevitably hit the country in the first half of 1994 and he 
annual inflation rate exceeded 100 percent as in 1980 (Kibritçioğlu; 2004). 
Several disinflation attempts since late 1970s seem to have failed one after another. 
Although the Turkish economy never experienced hyperinflation like Argentina or Israel in 
the period of global inflation from 1973 to 1994, it felt into a unique situation after 1994. In 
2002, the Turkish annual inflation rate was still 13 times higher than the average rate of 
inflation in the world, while global inflation rate has dropped from 25.3 percent in 1994 to 3.2 
percent in 2002 (Kibritçioğlu; 2004). Turkish governments introduced new disinflation 
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measures to stabilize the economy after the 1994 financial crisis. However, these efforts in 
1995, 1998 and 2000 failed to reduce the inflation rate to levels below 25 percent per year, as 
it had been in the early 1970s.  
 
In sum, in the beginning of 2000s, distinct aspects of the current Turkish political 
economy context were the persistence of price inflation under conditions of a crisis prone 
economic structure, persistent and rapidly expanding fiscal deficits, marginalization of the 
industrial relations and the severe erosion of moral values with increased public corruption. 
Following a series of poorly focused set of stabilization attempts through the decade, the 
government initiated a comprehensive disinflation program in July 1998 under the guidance 
of IMF (Yeldan; 2001). However, the 1998 disinflation program did not last very long, due to 
the Russian crisis in 1998, the domestic general elections in April 1999 and the devastating 
earthquake in August 1999. 
 Finally, in December 1999, the government adopted another disinflation program 
aided by IMF, aiming at decreasing the inflation rate to a single digit by the end of 2002. Yet, 
just eleven months after launching the disinflation program, Turkey experienced a severe 
financial crisis in November 2000. The government requested to access the Supplementary 
Reserve Facility from the IMF. The request was granted with 7.5 billions USD of additional 
support in December 22, and the technical limits of the monetary program have been revised. 
Only then the program could have been secured as the markets seemed to have calmed down. 
However, shortly after this rearrangement with the IMF, the public disclosure of a political 
dispute between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic on February 19, 2001 
badly hit the uneasy markets. The government could not endure the pressures of the markets 
any further, and let the exchange rates to free float after a significant devaluation of the 
Turkish Lira (Yeldan; 2001). This devaluation of the TL and subsequent economic 
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contraction became major determinants of price developments throughout the year 2001. 
Eventually both GDP and GNP grew at a rate of 7.8 percent in 2002 compared to the previous 
year. The economic contraction contributed a sharp rise in unemployment in 2001. The 
overall unemployment increased to 8.5 percent in 2001. Despite the growth performance in 
2002, the unemployment deepened to a rate of 10.7 percent. External debt stock increased 
from 113.9 billion USD in 2001 to 131.6 billion US Dollar in 2002. But its share in GNP 
dropped from 91.4 percent to 78.6 percent thanks to economic growth rate and real 
appreciation of the TL against dollar. In 2002, Treasury received 12.9 billion USD credit from 
the IMF Stand-By agreement. By the end of 2003, Turkey has a total external debt of nearly 
148 million USD. 25
 
4.3 Science and technology policy of Turkey 
So far, I have tried to give a general view of changing conditions and priorities of 
Turkey. In the previous section, ever lasting economic problems of the country had been 
presented. The economic conditions mentioned above are seen as the most important factor 
influencing the policymakers’ decisions. Technological decisions made by the policymakers 
and their impacts on society are also influenced unavoidably. In this section, I am going to 
focus on how science and technology policy has been influenced and changed towards more 
“profitable” technologies.    
The attempts of establishing a national policy in science and technology in Turkey 
date back to the planned economy period. The first institution that will have an active role in 
coordination and organization of research in basic and applied science was also established in 
                                                 
25 URL http://www.treasury.gov.tr/english/kaf/3-7alen.htm 
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the same period (1963)26. The purposes of the institution were mentioned in the “The First 
Five Year Development Plan” (1963-1967)27 such as: 
 
Scientific and Technical Research Council” (TUBITAK) will be established for the purpose of 
organizing, coordinating and promoting basic and applied research. Scientific and Technical 
Research Council will help in directing the research activities to the targets of the plan and 
setting the research priorities accordingly.  
 
The concept of ‘technology policy’ has been taken into account for the first time in 
‘The Forth Five Year Development Plan (1979-1983) and hence investment policies and 
enhancing the technological abilities of certain industrial sectors have also been highlighted. 
In the beginning of 1980s “Turkish Science Policy: 1983-2003” was prepared with the 
contribution of 300 scientists and experts. This was the first time that a detailed science and 
technology policy document had been tried to be prepared. In this document priority areas of 
technology had been put forward and a new institution was established. “The Supreme 
Council for Science and Technology (BTYK)” was responsible of designing science and 
technology policies of the country with the participation of ministers, high-level bureaucrats 
and representatives of non- governmental organizations that take an important role in the 
management of economy (www.tubitak.org.tr). However the policy could not have been 
implemented due to political climate of the time and the first meeting of the Council that had 
been established in 1983 could only been held in October 9th, 1989. In the second meeting of 
the Council that had been held in February 3rd, 1993, “Turkish Science and Technology 
Policy: 1993-2003” was approved. 
                                                 
26 URL www.tubitak.org.tr
27 In Turkey, general policies affecting all governmental and private sector projects and investments are set forth 
in the Five Year Development Plans prepared by the “State Planning Organization”. 
 48
There was a significant difference between the policies that were adapted in 1960s and 
1990s. From the establishment of the “Turkish Republic” in 1923 to the 1990s, the purpose of 
the policy was gaining capability in the fields of applied sciences such as mathematics, 
physics and engineering as well as agricultural and medical sciences28. It was considered that 
“gaining capability in science” was the first and foremost factor for “gaining capability in 
“technology”. With the changing climate in the whole world where economic competitiveness 
and productivity gained more importance, the science policy of Turkey has inevitably 
changed in ‘90s. Technology, and science as source of technology, has become a productive 
power and they gained a strategic importance in social welfare and economic development of 
countries. As a result “science policies” of countries have become “science and technology 
policies” and Turkey was not an exception.        
The change of the Turkish science policy towards a science and technology policy 
with more “economy related” purposes can be recognized in the document approved by “The 
Supreme Council for Science and Technology” in 1993. The adapted policy in 1993 was 
highlighting the determinant role of science and technology in 
• sustaining economic growth, 
• surviving the vitality of national economy,   
• upgrading the living standards, and  
• international competitive advantage. (www.tubitak.org.tr) 
In order to attain the economic and social goals of the nation, it was also suggesting 
some regulatory measures to be taken in the fields of S&T. These measures were;  
• enhancing the intellectual capacity of the country,  
                                                 
28 URL (www.tubitak.org.tr) 
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• upgrading the “Research and Development” ability of the country in 
the new pervasive generic technologies,  
• focusing this ability on the fields of economic priority,  
• encouraging the activities aiming at the transformation of scientific and 
technological findings into economic and/or social benefit immediately,  
• accelerating the diffusion of new generic technologies in all fields of 
economic activity,  
• financing the technology-intensive mega projects that will raise the 
technological ability of the country and create vividness in the economy. 
(www.tubitak.gov.tr)  
The reasons of the changes in the policy have been mentioned in the “National 
Science and Technology Policy and Agenda” that took its final form in August 25th, 1997.  
In this document, it is mentioned that countries having superiority in technology and 
science are progressing towards an absolute domination in industry and in all other economic 
activities. Superiority in science and technology is the determinant factor in the reallocation of 
world’s resources and in increasing the welfare of society. Therefore, countries having 
superiority in science and technology are progressing towards dominating the information age 
and the future world. It is further discussed that Turkey does not have an active role in 
maintaining the technological progress but is directly affected by the consequences of the 
progress made by technologically dominating countries. Turkey, in respect of the global 
processes, has to cope with many problems. Among them, the most vital one is to catch up 
with technological changes of the age to maintain economic and social progress. (TUBITAK, 
1997) 
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4.4 Environmental policy of Turkey 
The environmental policy of Turkey has been governed by the Five-Year 
Development Plans and the Environmental Law that became effective in 1983. The 
Environmental Law (coded 2872) starts from the principle of the "polluter pays" and handles 
the environmental issue on a very broad scope. The aim of the law, which considers the 
environment as a whole is not only to prevent and eliminate pollution, but also to consider the 
future generations. However, the measures to be taken and the arrangements to be made 
should be compatible with the economic and development targets.29
Turkey has made some progress in the last fifteen years in the area of the environment, 
notably in the adoption of legislation and the launching of conservation schemes. For 
instance, the “Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation” (EIAR) was put into force in 
1993 to regulate the administrative and technical principles that will be obeyed by all public 
and private organizations, institutions and agencies whose proposed activities may cause 
environmental problems. However, in terms of implementing legislation, there still remains a 
lot to be done. In addition, with regard to the integration of environmental considerations into 
other policies, no progress can be reported. 30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
30 November 2003 Evaluation Report of Turkey, European Union. 
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5 THE BERGAMA MOVEMENT AND THE CYANIDE CONTROVERSY 
 
Because ordinary people are excluded from much of the debate about technological 
decision making and environmental problems, the agenda tends to be dominated by 
“specialists and experts”. Ordinary people loose both the voice in making their views known 
and the courage for improving things in their country. Many people lack the confidence and 
the sense of their own power in changing this agenda (Taylor et al; 1992). 
The peasants living in the Aegean region of Turkey, however, have managed to create 
a special case in the technological history of their country. The way their government 
tolerated to a foreign investment with a “dirty” technology for economic reasons was 
intolerable for them. Their resistance to the company had caught a lot of attention both inside 
and outside the country and was known as the “Bergama Movement”. 
Before starting to analyze the movement, it will be helpful to give a rough background 
information about the town that will be the subject of our discussion. Bergama is a historical 
town with a population of 50.000 and it is located near the north west coast of Turkey in the 
Aegean region. It is inside the border of Izmir (Smyrna) district and approximately eighty 
kilometers north of Izmir, the third biggest city of Turkey.  
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The town is one of the oldest historical cities of the country and lies over the remains 
of the ancient Roman city “Pergamon” of which there are extensive ruins remaining. Bergama 
has inherited the name of the ancient city together with the remains of Acropolis, the temples 
of Zeus and Athena, the steep amphitheater and the health center of Asclepion. Ironically, 
Ascleipon was named after Aesculapius; “the God of Health” and patients used to be healed 
there by the sound of water and music in ancient times.  
With all its historical treasures, Bergama has a considerable economic gain from 
tourism. However the main economic activity of the region is agriculture. The local people 
are overwhelmingly dependent on small scale agriculture and they grow cotton, 
tobacco,olives and a wide range of fruits and vegetables. The olives of the region are 
considered to be the best in the country due to the mild climatic conditions. The prime 
agricultural land in the alluvia filled Bakircay valley also produces some of the world’s best 
cotton, pine nuts, citrus fruits, grains and tobacco. There is also animal husbandry and 
honeybee production in the region. 
Due to the complex geology of the Aegean region, there is a diversity of mineral 
deposits (Mobbs;1996). With the changing financial policies mentioned in the previous 
chapter and the adoption of liberal and flexible foreign investment policies, international 
companies were invited to the region for mineral exploration by the Turkish government. In 
October 1989, an Australian/Canadian/French multinational company named ‘’Eurogold 
Mining Limited’’ was given permission to explore for gold in the region for a period of 30 
months. Having found enough gold for production near Bergama (a total of 24 tons), the 
company got the “license of production” for 10 years from the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources in 1992 together with a permission from Ministry of the Environment. The 
company chose the location for construction of the ‘’Ovacik Gold Mine’’, which is located 
adjacent to Ovacik village with a population of 350 people and close to Camkoy and Narlica 
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villages (total population 1000). Bergama is located about 9 km. east from the mine and 14 
other villages with a total population of 6000 are located within a 10 km. radius of the mine.31  
The local people were very glad when gold was explored in their region:  
 
“We got very excited at first. We thought we were going to be rich. We thought that the mine 
was going to provide our children new jobs.”  
said one of the local people to a Greek newspaper. 32
 
After learning the company would be using “cyanide” for leaching gold from the ore, 
the perception of the local people started to change: 
  
Scientists from Turkey and other countries came to our region. They started to lecture us about 
gold. They showed us films about the working conditions of other gold mines in the world. 
They took us to Lefke in Cyprus to visit a gold mine that used cyanide. We were shocked with 
the view. There was no sign of life around… 
 said one of the locals who would be the leader of the Bergama movement soon.33 (See 
picture1)  
   
Peasants of Bergama had a meeting with their Major and held a news conference to 
announce their findings. This was the first time they resisted the company. They announced 
that they did not want the gold mine on their hills.         
Eurogold officials replied that the cyanide would be kept in strong clay pools and that 
it would evaporate under the sun into largely harmless substances such as carbon dioxide and 
nitrate34. Therefore it would not be a thread to the environment. 
                                                 
31 URL (www.ovacik-altin.com) 
32 (Paratritis Daily; 25.06.2003) 
33 my translation; Paratritis Daily; 25.06.2003 
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The method Eurogold will be using to extract gold is called ‘’heap leaching’’. This is a 
widely used technology in gold mines since 1960s. Cyanide is the most popular chemical used 
by mining corporations to extract gold from ore, despite the fact that leaks or spills of this 
chemical are extremely toxic to fish, plant life and human beings. Cyanide leaching involves 
spraying a sodium cyanide solution (a colorless solid with a slide odor of bitter almonds) on 
ground ore or on old waste rock, known as tailings. The gold forms a water-soluble chemical 
compound with the cyanide which is then run over activated carbon to extract gold. The 
cyanide waste that is left over is supposed to be stored in lined and covered ponds to prevent 
contact with local animals and birds. (Drillbits&Tailings; 2000, Volume 5, Number 3)35
 
Operational Features of Ovacık Gold Mine 
 
 
  
Although the cyanide solution eventually breaks down in the presence of sunlight and 
air as the mining companies say, it will not do so when it seeps underground, under cloudy or 
rainy conditions or during winter in cold countries. Most importantly, not all of cyanide 
                                                                                                                                                        
34 see (www.ovacik-altin.com) 
35 Available at URL http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/5_03/vs.html 
 55
breaks down quickly into largely harmless substances. Many of the breakdown compounds 
are still toxic to aquatic organisms and may persist in the environment for a significant 
amount of time. In addition, toxic heavy metals such as lead, cadmium and mercury 
commonly present in the ore can be mobilized during leaching process (Korte and Coulston; 
1997). 
There are a significant amount of accidents in the gold mines around the world that 
caught the attention of the local people in Bergama. In 1992, for example the cyanide and 
heavy metal leaks from ‘Summitville’ gold mine in U.S.A had killed all aquatic life along a 
27 kilometers radius. Again in U.S.A, by a similar cyanide spill from ‘Brewer’ gold mine, 
over 11000 fish were killed.36  
Having been informed by the scientists about cyanide and its effects, the now 
organized peasants started the judicial struggle in 1994. A group of 794 Bergama villagers 
brought the case to court. As it was the Ministry of the Environment which, in response to 
Eurogold’s demand for a “license of production”, issued an act according to which there were 
no health and environmental drawbacks to constructing and operating the mine, they 
petitioned against the ministerial act in the Administrative Court of Izmir37  
Eurogold, however, did not wait for the ruling. In 1996, they cut 2500 pines and 800  
olive trees and began constructing a mine surrounded with barbed wire and  
watch towers. As a reaction to this, nearly 10000 villagers surrounded the mine that was in 
construction and protested the company (See picture 3). In January 1997, the people of 
Bergama held a referendum and 100% had voted against the mine. In April 1997, 5000 
peasants from 17 villages occupied the mine, and forced the regional governor to close it for a 
month. Despite all the reaction, the construction of the mine was completed in the same year. 
                                                 
36 See ‘Drillbits&Tailings; 2000, Volume 5, Number 3 in URL 
http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/5_03/vs.html for more information.  
37 File numbers 1994/501 and 1994/643. 
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At the end of the 3-year long judicial process, in May 1997, the final ruling 
emphasized that the ministerial act was in violation of the principles stipulated in 
Constitutional Article 17 that reads “everyone has the right to life and the right to develop 
his/her material and spiritual entity”, and Article 56 which reads “everyone has the right to 
live in a healthy, decent environment. It is the duty of the state and citizens to improve the 
natural environment and to prevent environmental pollution”’38 (Coban; 2002). The final 
ruling declared Eurogold’s licenses invalid and said the mine should be closed. Under the 
Constitution, the country’s law enforcement agencies had to comply with the court decision. 
The peasants of Bergama celebrated their victory by dancing in circles with their local music 
of pipes and drums. 
But the mine remained. In October 1998, Eurogold had applied to the Ministry of 
Health in order to start its production since all the additional precautions were taken. The firm 
claimed that the mine had become one of the safest gold mines in the world (even the safest) 
due to additional technologically advanced pollution-control systems. One of the officials I 
interviewed told that an INCO39 unit (see picture 2) was installed during this period to destroy 
cyanide before tailings are released into a fully-lined, impermeable dam which is designed to 
withstand a major seismic event (0.6g40). He also claimed that this combination of cyanide 
destruction and lined containment of tailings is the first of its kind in the world.41  
Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) was made to 
prepare a report to examine the new claims of the firm to decide whether the risks mentioned 
in the decision file of the Council of State were still existent or in tolerable levels. The report 
was prepared by 11 scientists from different academic fields. It was issued after an 8 month 
work and concluded that:  
                                                 
38 the decision of the Council of State, file no. 1996/5477, decision no. 1997/2312, dated 13/5/1997) 
39 INCO – a propriety cyanide destruction unit 
40 g - Newton’s gravitational acceleration constant 
41 for more information see ‘Case Study on Tailings Management, International Councils on Metals and the 
Environment (ICME)’ and United National Environment Programme (UNEP), November 1998). 
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 The use of cyanide does not constitute an environmental problem in Ovacık gold mine and the 
risks claimed to threaten human and environmental health in the Higher Administrative Court 
ruling (which resulted in the withdrawal of approval for the mine) have either been totally 
eliminated or reduced far below the acceptable maximum limits. (Translation of the 
Assessment Report by TUBITAK; October 1999) 
 
This report, however, had been criticized by some NGOs (such as TMMOB42, TTB43, 
Greenpeace) and professors from various universities. They argued that the report was not 
independent, had some strict conclusions that the mine would not pose any danger to public 
health eventhough there were no scientists or experts of public health issues or any doctors in 
the commission that prepared the report. They also criticized that although some experts in the 
commission had mentioned some negative sides of the issue in their independent field reports, 
these findings were not mentioned in the conclusion part. The risks of an accident and a 
catastrophic earthquake since the area is a first degree earthquake zone (see map1) were 
underestimated. 44 Moreover the probability of an accident while the cyanide was being 
transferred from Italy in containers via ships and trucks had never been mentioned, although 
the risk of a traffic accident is considerably high in Turkish roads. 
Another concern that was shared both by the locals and the experts that were against 
the gold mine was that due to economic conditions of the time and the profit oriented policies 
of the government, not only the mine would be permitted to go on its production but also new 
mines using the same technique would be opened in other regions of Turkey since the total 
                                                 
42 Turkish Engineers and Architects Chamber Association 
43 Association of Turkish Doctors 
44 see ‘Critique of the Assessment Report of TUBITAK by Turkish Engineers and Architects Chamber 
Association(TMMOB)           
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reserves of gold in Turkey had been estimated as 6500 tons with a total profit of 800 billion 
USD if refined, 80 billion USD otherwise.45  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Turkish Parliament passed some arbitration 
laws in 1999 in a climate where Turkey was suffering from an economic crisis and a 
catastrophic earthquake. During the discussions on arbitration and the parliamentary sittings 
about the gold mine in 1999, it was suggested that arbitration laws would make it possible for 
Eurogold to bring the case to an international arbitration tribunal and as a result it could put 
the mine into operation46. It was also reported in Milliyet daily47 that Eurogold had the right to 
file a claim for compensation of US$ 300 million in case of a refusal of the company’s 
application. 
The concern of the locals who were against the mine seemed to be realized when the 
Cabinet of the time had agreed on a principal decision that Eurogold Mining Company could 
operate its mine since the experts concluded in the highly discussed and criticized TUBITAK 
report that Eurogold had taken every kind of precaution to prevent any possible damage that 
can be caused by cyanide. The locals brought the decision of the Cabinet to the court once 
more since they found it undemocratic and contrary to the final decision of the Council of 
State.      
Meanwhile, Eurogold was having some changes in its organization. They admitted 
making some mistakes in communicating with the locals in the past due to limited knowledge 
of the sensitivities and customs of their Turkish hosts although they met all the international 
standards.48  For this reason they had employed a new team of experienced and senior Turkish 
mining professionals. As a result, the French and Canadian partners of Eurogold sold their 
                                                 
45 Milliyet daily; 5.6.1999 
46 Cumhuriyet daily, 25/7/1999; 16/8/1999  
47 6/1/2001 
48 See the company brochure ‘Now and Beyond 2000 
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shares to the Australian Normandy Mining Limited and the company changed its name as 
Normandy. 
 Normandy tried harder to convince the local people before starting their production. 
They told that they would employ more than 230 people, 82% of whom would be from the 
nearby villages. They committed that they would provide extensive training to all of the 
workers and periodic free health checks for the workers and their families. Fifty new houses 
would be constructed for the Ovacık villagers whose lands were bought by the mine and 
whose houses could be damaged due to production.  
They also committed about the production that sodium cyanide would be transported 
to the site in small amounts as required in specially designed containers that would meet the 
highest safety standards. Sodium cyanide would be stored within a secure, enclosed area on-
site. The storage area would be fireproof and be locked at all times. They claimed that he 
possibility of seepage of cyanide or heavy metals into underground water was extremely low 
and the quality of groundwater would be monitored at six boreholes located near the tailings 
facility. Even in a worst-case-scenario, the quality of underground drinking water would be at 
no risk of impact from seepage.49  Dust generated during blasting, excavation and 
transportation at Ovacik mine would be minimized. Crushing and screening will occur within 
a closed circuit. The air inside would be extracted through a wet scrubber system that would 
wet dust and prevent it becoming airborne50. Open pit mining would occur only during the 
first three years of operation. Thereafter, production would continue from underground, and 
dust from operations would reduce even further. 
The impact of noise and vibration would be minimized. Monitoring devices would 
ensure variances in noise and vibration would not exceed regulatory limits. To minimize 
effects of blasting, local residents would be informed prior to blasting. 
                                                 
49 An Assessment Report by TUBITAK-YDABÇAG Commission on Eurogold Ovacik Gold Mine, October 
1999. 
50 see the company brochure ‘Now and Beyond 2000’ 
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The closed circuit nature of the processing plant at Ovacik mine would prevent any 
reagents from coming into contact with the outside environment. The system would 
automatically shut down in case of a malfunction, minimizing any risk of impact outside the 
plant.  
Soil taken from the open pit would be reused in rehabilitation. About 900m3 of make-
up water per day would be required for the operation. Reuse of water would be maximized to 
ensure that local water resources were not affected.   
 In an event of a catastrophic earthquake (ie. greater than 0.6g) that would damage the 
tailings storage facility and release tailings into the environment, the impact would still be 
negligible, if any, because of the prior destruction of sodium cyanide in the tailings. 
At the end of mining operations, the entire mine site would be rehabilitated. The 
underground workings would be sealed. Infrastructure would be removed and the area 
rehabilitated. The tailings facility would be dewatered and rehabilitated by using a multi-layer 
cover. A 0.5m layer of topsoil suitable for growing crops or grazing would be placed back on 
the surface. Details of the rehabilitation project would be finalized after consultation with the 
local people. 51
In May 2001, production started by using 657 kilograms of cyanide a day to obtain 10 
kilograms of gold and silver52 in spite of the local resistance and the binding court decision 
ruling that the mining activity would be harmful to human health and harmful to nature.  
From 19/5/2001 to 31/4/2004, 12.4 tons of gold and 13.5 tons of silver were extracted. 
As of June 2004, 439 people were employed in the mine with a salary range above Turkish 
standards. The workers I have interviewed mentioned about the undergoing projects of the 
mine in which young local girls are being educated in foreign language, computer and office 
                                                 
51 see the company brochure ‘Now and Beyond 2000’ 
52 Hürriyet daily, 28/5/2001; Zaman daily, 28/5/2001; Milliyet daily, 12/6/2001  
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management so that they can find qualified jobs. They are also providing grants to students 
and financial support to local schools. They repaired the local mosque and built a library. The 
Community Relations officer of the mine said that the reaction towards the mine has been 
minimized in the last years. The mine has been in production for 3 years and the villagers are 
convinced that nothing had happened. They have learned from their neighbours or family 
members who are working in the mine that it is really safe. An animal sanctuary has been 
constructed in the mine where ducks and other animals are living. It proves that no harm is 
given to the natural life. The mine is said to be audited monthly or semi-monthly by İzmir 
Governorship - Monitoring & Auditing Committee which is an independent state commission. 
In addition, the mine is also audited by the Ministry of Health- İzmir Health Directorate, 
Ministry of Environment General Directorate of Preventing & Controlling Environmental 
Pollution, General Directorate of Mineral Works together with an annual international audit of 
EUROMINES European Miners Association. Regarding the tests done, all the commitments 
are said to be met and far below the limits as of the time I have visited the mine. (See the 
charts 1,2,3,4,5,6) 
Ttwo months after I visited and left Bergama to complete this thesis, something 
interesting has happened. First the controversy that seemed to be quitened down reemerged 
with a verdict handed down by the Council of State in July 2004. The Cabinet decision that let 
the mine operate was reversed by this verdict. The locals seemed to win the second victory 
against the mine via another court decision. Two weeks later, Normandy Mining Ltd. 
announced that the company could not be productive as anticipated due to the public reaction 
and the long lasting courts that are going on. In the first week of August 2004, Ovacik Gold 
Mine was sold to the Canadian Frontier Pacific Ltd. for $45 million that is one third of the 
total investment done by Normandy Mining Ltd. The manager of Normany had told that the 
owner of the gold mine had changed, but the production process would go on without any 
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change.53 The executives of the mine also announced that the verdict would not put a halt to 
operations in Ovacik but merely prevented proceeding according to the Cabinet decision. 
“The Prime Ministry has the right to object to this verdict” said an executive board member.54  
The attorney of the villagers also admitted that possibility. He commented on the 
verdict and said that another secret decree within 30 days could be encountered, or the Prime 
Ministry could still object to the verdict. But under normal conditions, Council of State 
decisions should be implemented.55
And the decision was implemented. The mine was closed in August 18th until a new 
decision. This leaves an open door for the mine and it is believed that the mine will find 
another way to operate again since the country is still fighting with economic problems.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Milliyet Daily, 6.8.2004 
54 Turkish Daily News, 17.7.2004 
55 Turkish Daily News, 17.7.2004 
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“The lesson we have learned from our project is that regardless of our advanced 
technology and excellent safety management, it is how well we communicate with the local 
community that really counts .”’                             (From the brochure of the Normandy gold 
mine in Bergama, July 2004) 
 
6  DIVERGING RATIONALITIES 
 
In this chapter, I am going to clarify how the debate in Bergama started and turned 
into an unresolved conflict since the decision about the siting of the mine had been made 
without the locals’ approval. My main purpose will be to analyse the debate in the light of my 
theoretical approach that was discussed in the second chapter. 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that public risk perceptions are not only 
dependent on an objectively existent physical risk. As Wynn puts forward, the perceptions 
and responses to risks are also rationally based in judgements of the behaviour and 
trustworthiness of expert institutions who are supposed to control and direct the risky process 
involved (Wynn; 1996a, 57). Since the final decision of these institutions about the modern 
technologies directly affect the lives and futures of people on a mass scale, control and 
direction of these technologies have become a matter of much greater complexity and scope 
than it has ever been (Wartofsky; 1992, 16). At present, owners of power and knowledge have 
been the final decision makers. As Marx Wartofsky points out; power rests with elites of 
government (or military in some cases) and the technical knowledge required for policy 
decisions rests with the experts and scientific and technical personnel who are either part of 
such elites or are consultant to them. Generally, the public is poorly represented (Wartofsky; 
1992, 17). What naturally follows are the conflicts and public reactions especially to risk 
bearing issues.      
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The cyanide controversy of Bergama is a good example of such conflicts. Having the 
economic, politic and social problems of a developing country that were discussed in the 
previous chapters, policymakers and the governors are under an enormous pressure to rely on 
economic activity that offers quick returns. These activities mostly ignore environmental 
protection and companies with risky technologies are often tolerated. The siting of such a 
company has been the subject of a long lasting conflict in Turkey for about 15 years. 
The physical threat of the cyanide has always been in the center of the debate in 
Bergama after the locals have been informed by some scientists and professors about the 
possible risks concerning the use of cyanide by the gold company. Before this scientific 
inquiry, the locals were happy that gold was found in their fields. The villagers I have 
interviewed told that they thought they would possibly be rich and some of their unemployed 
children would be able to find jobs in the mine after it was opened. The mine did not seem as 
a threat to them in the beginning. The siting of the mine adjacent to their village did not seem 
as a problem. However they had some concerns about their fields since most of them were 
peasants. They were more personal concerns since at first they were unaware of the 
technology that would be used in the mine. They were living on small scale agriculture and 
animal growing. They were worried about what would happen after the mine would close. 
However, they thought that they would earn good money either by selling their fields to the 
mine or by working there. Therefore, in the beginning their concerns were not too much to 
oppose the mine. 
This situation changed short after they learned that the technology to be used in the 
mine could cause environmental pollution. Some local scientists and professors were 
compelled to the arena since their previous studies about cyanide and its impacts on 
environment showed controversial results than the mine officials provided. They gave some 
factual evidence from other gold mines in the world and probabilities of what could happen in 
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case of a cyanide spill. The locals’ concerns about their safety grew with this scientific 
inquiry from some local experts who are also against the mine. 
In my point of view, this was the beginning of the risk debate in Bergama. The 
perceptions of the locals about the possible risk started to change after this point. While in the 
beginning they were perceiving the mine as a possible risk to their personal future as farmers 
which could be compensated and ignored if the mine would provide some resources to them, 
such as money or employment.  
One of the villagers I have interviewed told that: 
 
“...after finding out the possible consequences of cyanide usage to the environment and the 
health of people, we felt as if we were cheated. I do not trust the decision makers. Why should 
I? Weren’t they the ones who drank contaminated tea after Chernobyl? Wasn’t that tea contain 
radiation? If not, why lots of people died of cancer afterwards?” 
 
The locals were also angry with the government. They were not informed about the 
physical risks at first and they felt cheated after learning the possible outcomes. Since they 
didn’t have a say in the decision process, they decided to react the decision making process 
that undermined them although the issue was directly related to their health and environment. 
Their perception of the mine as a risk to their environment became a collective one. They 
started to mobilize their resources to attract the attention and gain sympathy of the public in 
general. They tried to learn more about the issue by the help of NGOs that entered the arena, 
they brought the issue to court in order to stop the construction of the mine, they protested the 
mine by surrounding the mine that was in construction, they held a referandum and 100% had 
voted against the mine. 
Meanwhile, the second leading actor of the stage, namely the gold mining company, 
also started to mobilize its resources. Their means to influence and convince the locals was 
 66
money at first. They had undergone some projects to repair the local mosque and built a 
library, they gave courses to educate young local girls in foreign language, computer and 
office management so that they could find qualified jobs, they built new houses for the locals 
whose fields were bought by the mine. One of the executives of the mine that I interviewed 
said that he also personally went to the village to convince the locals, to listen to their 
complaints and to understand why they were against to the mine. He also said that he could 
understand their worries. However, since the perceptions were different between these actors, 
they could not come to a common ground despite the mine’s positive attempts. As the 
executive told in the interview, the main risk in their perception would be not operating the 
mine. Because it would be very profitable for the whole country, it would make a lot of 
money that is desperately needed in this economic environment of Turkey and it would 
provide lots of jobs to the locals.  
The officials of the mine also gave evidences to persuade the society, they published 
their audit reports and their test results. An animal sanctuary had been constructed in the mine 
where ducks and other animals were living to prove that no harm was given to the natural life. 
They claimed that all their commitments were met and far below limits after they started the 
production. Normally this evidence would help to resolve the conflict and eliminate the risk 
perceived by the locals if it had emerged due to lack of knowledge. However, the reason why 
they perceived the mine as a risk was the contradictory evidence and events that made locals 
more suspicious. 
The most important thing that decreased the trust of the locals further and increased 
their perception of risk was the “court result” that they were waiting for. The Administrative 
Court had declared Eurogold’s licenses invalid and said the mine should be closed. This was a 
victory for the locals, but not the end of the debate. This result meant that there might be 
something wrong with the mine. The test results and the evidence provided by the mine to 
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convince the locals might not be dependable. If everything was normal, the court would let 
the mine operate. 
The third leading actor of the debate, namely the Turkish government of the time, had 
entered to the arena in this point. Due to the economic conditions of the time56 and the 
pressure of IMF, the government decided to reevaluate the issue. A state research organization 
(TUBITAK) prepared a report for the government that concludes the risks mentioned in the 
final court ruling were not existing anymore due to the new equipment installed. This report 
was highly criticized by many scientists, professors and NGOs57 for not being independent 
and dependable. However, these criticisms were undermined by the government. By using its 
“power”, the government opened the mine with a special approval.  
The controversy between the experts about the above mentioned report is worth 
mentioning. Experts had become a part of the conflict since their opinions about the issue 
differed. This was a proof that even the experts were not realistic in their perceptions. They 
had their own values and they were acting accordingly. The professors in universities and the 
experts working in private organizations were believed to be more independent than the 
experts working in the state owned research institution. It was discussed that the dependency 
of the experts who prepared the TUBITAK report caused a detoriation of locals’ trust towards 
the policy makers.  
The scientific uncertainty about the issue was an important factor that made the 
conflict stay unresolved. As Wynne also discusses, although the scientific uncertainities about 
what happens chemically, physically and biologically in a landfill site are huge, the 
opportunities for examining and reducing them are extremely limited. Thus the effects of 
putting a waste into a site can only be approximately known and these effects depend on how 
the site is operated and managed (Wynne; 1992b). Therefore, uncertainity underlying 
                                                 
56 see the 4th Chapter. 
57 See the 5th Chapter 
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decisions is a social risk because of the institutionalized mistrust that pervades Turkish 
system.    
Together with the further detoriation of trust and credibility, the cyanide conflict had 
been deepened by the government’s decision about reopening of the mine. The government 
used its political power in the decision making without convincing the locals first. Therefore a 
successful solution to the conflict that would end the reaction against the mine was very 
difficult to achieve.   
Although it has been said by the mine officials in my interviews that the reaction to 
the mine has been minimized in the last years and the debate seems to be resolved, all of the 
villagers I had interviewed were still against the mine. They were not trusting that the 
evidence given by the mine was correct. They thought that they were being manipulated. 
They were also uncomfortable by the dynamites blasted in the mine. They told that it felt as if 
it was an earthquake. Some of their houses were destructed due to these blasts. The mine gave 
them money for their loss but it was not enough. They were not compensated as they should 
be. Moreover, they thought that their underground water could be contaminated by arsenic. 
Some reporters from media came to the region very recently to find out about it but they were 
stopped by the miners. This increased the villagers’ suspicion. The officials of the mine 
answered this claim that after they learned this complaint, they had tested the water in the 
wells, but everything was normal.  
When I asked the villagers why they stopped reacting together to the mine, they 
answered: 
 
 “What had changed when we reacted, they are still operating despite the court. As long as we 
have “a US lover” government, nothing would change. They would do whatever IMF 
wanted.” 
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They also admitted that the mine is paying well and no one working in the mine wants 
to loose his job. Naturally, the villagers who are employed by the mine are not reacting 
anymore. 
However, according to my interviews with the villagers, I have realized that the most 
of the villagers still see the mine as a threat to their way of living and their farming activities. 
The villages are also separated into two as the ones who are against the mine and the ones 
who are not. This also creates a tension in their social life. However the politicians and the 
executive officers of the mine still see the threat in not operating the mine. They see it as a 
door to more profit. They hope more mines will be opened. Therefore, the debate in Bergama 
seems that it may never be resolved successfully. In my perception, it is a third level of debate 
about different social values, cultural life styles, and their impacts on risk perception. In this 
case, neither technical expertise nor institutional opennes are adequate conditions for public 
approval. Although trustable knowledge about the physical threat may help, it seems 
improbable. The contradictory evidence provided by the local and state experts brings the 
conflict to a more complicated position. The negative past experience of the people in 
environmental, political and economical issues also deepens the conflict. The best way to 
avoid the conflict in the beginning was to let the local people participate in the decision 
making. However public participation is not likely in many countries, and Turkey is not an 
exception. The parties of the Bergama debate tried to negotiate, some positive steps had been 
taken, lots of locals started to work in the mine. However a successful resolution has never 
been achieved. Moreover the future of the conflict does not seem promising as long as the 
locals are compensated in a way or convinced that the mine is totally safe.        
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7 CONCLUSION  
 
Throughout this thesis I have presented how a physical environmental risk is 
perceived differently by the various actors of a social arena. In this last chapter, I am going to 
summarize the main points of this thesis and give concluding remarks.  
As I have discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis, the perceptions of 
individuals concerning a risky technology are affected by a number of factors. “How 
decisions about risky technologies are made and the way these decisions affect the 
perceptions of individuals” are among the most important questions in risk debates. Since 
societies have become more critical about the technologies with adverse effects to their 
environment, the decisions concerning these technologies have gained more importance. If 
social groups are not integrated in the decisions concerning their interests, conflicts arise 
inevitably. Individuals who are uncomfortable with the decisions or policies made on their 
behalf, are attracted to the arena where the conflict has aroused. They try to maximize their 
opportunity to influence the outcome of the decision process by mobilizing their social 
resources. These resources can be money, power, social influence, value commitment and 
evidence and they may be used to gain attention and support of the general public, to 
influence the arena rules, and to become superior to other actors. The more resources a group 
can mobilize in an arena, the more likely it is that it dominates the conflict resolution process 
and gets its point of view incorporated in the final decision. 
In the case of developing countries, the final decision is mostly taken by the actor who 
has the political power. With enormous economic and political pressures, the policymakers in 
the developing countries are often in conflict with the increasing demands to satisfy basic 
human needs like clean air, water, education, employment and satisfactory environmental 
quality. The supremacy of economics over all aspects, including the development of science 
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and technology mostly causes irreparable damage to the environment. This situation increases 
the perceived risks and diminishes the trust given to decision makers. 
 If lack of credibility and trust is the case, the solution to the conflict aroused by 
different perceptions of risk, can hardly be achieved. In this case, conflicts can be avoided 
before they have aroused by participating the public to the decisions made. Decision making 
here requires a fundamental consensus on the issues underlying the risk debate. If this is not 
the case, the public will not possibly be satisfied with the outcome. The conflict will stay 
unresolved and provoke new conflicts. 
Another important factor affecting the perceptions of individuals is the “safety” issue. 
If the individuals do not feel themselves “safe” near an industrial plant with a risky 
technology, there will most probably arise a conflict. This feeling of “safeness” also depends 
on some factors such as trust and credibility to the institutions and experts. If the individuals 
lack the trust to the institutions due to past experience, they probably will not believe any 
evidence proving that the technologies are safe. Furthermore if there is contradicting evidence 
provided by different experts, or conflicts between them, the experts loose their credibility 
and the individuals feel more insecure. This feeling of insecurity increases whatever risks they 
perceive and deepens the conflict to a level where it is more difficult to find a resolution. 
There is still a way of finding a common solution to a conflict regarding a risky 
technology. If the individuals who are affected by the adverse consequences of a technology 
are compensated, they may be willing to tolerate the risks attached to above mentioned 
technologies. These compensations may be anything, such as money or employment, that 
serve to the individuals’ needs and interests. Since the interests of the majority are served, it 
may be considered that the conflict is successfully  resolved. However, the new technologies 
of modern states are mostly difficult to control and the nuclear, chemical, ecological and 
biotechnological risks they produce are considered as impossible to compensate.  
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 To sum up, this study of cyanide controversy shows how perceptions of actors differ 
regarding a technology with adverse environmental effects. The different perceptions and the 
interests of the relevant actors caused a debate about the issue. This debate turned into a 
conflict due to three factors. First the final decision about the issue is made by the government 
without integration of the locals to the decision making due to some external pressures and 
poor economic conditions. Second, because of past experience and scientific uncertainities, 
the individuals were lacking the trust towards the policy makers and the experts. The 
controversy between the experts about the issue also made the individuals feel more insecure 
and worried about their future and therefore loose their trust further. Finally, since the 
individuals were not compensated enough to meet their interests, their resistance to the mine 
continued. Although the resistance seems to be minimized in the last few years, the conflict 
has still not been resolved satisfactorily. And it most probably will reemerge until the three 
factors mentioned above are met. 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURES 
Figure 1: Foreign direct investments of Turkey 
 (Data taken from Undersecratariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade) 
 
 FDI INFLOWS TO TURKEY 
YEARS AUTHORIZED FDI (MILLION $)
NO. OF FOREIGN 
CAPITAL COMPANIES REALIZATIONS (MILLION $)
1980 97 78 35
1981 338 109 141 
1982 167 147 103
1983 103 166 87 
1984 271 235 113
1985 234 408 99 
1986 364 619 125
1987 655 836 115 
1988 821 1.172 354
1989 1.512 1.525 663 
1990 1.861 1.856 684
1991 1.967 2.123 907 
1992 1.820 2.330 911
1993 2.063 2.554 746 
1994 1.478 2.830 636
1995 2.938 3.161 934 
1996 3.836 3.582 914
1997 1.678 4.068 852 
1998 1.646 4.533 953
1999 1.700 4.950 813 
2000 3.477 5.328 1.707
2001 2.725 5.841 3.288 
2002 2.243 6.280 1.042
2003(*) 1.208 6.511 150 
TOTAL 35.203 --- 16.372
As of June 
30,2003    
 
 
Figure 2: Total debt to World Bank 
 (Data taken from www.worldbank.org) 
 
 
In millionUS$ 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Commitments 3,333 3,021 2,763 2,434 2,632 3,801 4,344 5,890 4,820 
Disbursements 288 611 329 259 264 957 820 1,679 759 
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Figure 3: Total debt to IMF  
(Data taken from www.imf.org) 
 
 
Credit Outstanding, 
Turkey  (in USD) 
Date Totals 
31.08.2004 10.180.347.315
31.12.2003 11.040.901.478
31.12.2002 11.063.294.460
31.12.2001 7.649.577.660
31.12.2000 2.182.809.300
31.12.1999 441.863.445
31.12.1998 187.828.312
31.12.1997 299.937.937
31.12.1996 313.600.500
31.12.1995 313.600.500
31.12.1994 160.375.500
31.12.1989 24.686.250
31.12.1988 151.203.281
31.12.1987 369.761.718
31.12.1986 604.177.775
31.12.1985 822.316.758
31.12.1984 990.878.959
 
 
MAP: Earthquake zones in Turkey 
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CHARTS: 
Chart1) Cyanide in process water  
 
Chart 2) Heavy metals in process water in 2001-2002 
 
 
 
Chart 3) Noise 
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Chart 4) Blasting 
, 
 
 
 
  
Chart 5) Particulate dust 
 
 
Chart 6) Cyanide reality in Turkey 
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PICTURES: 
Picture1) Cyanide pollution in Lefke, Cyprus. 
 
 
Picture2) The INCO circuit that destroys free and weak acid dissociable cyanide. 
 
 
Picture 3) Reaction of the local people 
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OTHER PICTURES OF THE MINE: 
 
The picture of the mine taken from an airplane, by Volkan Yuksel, 01.05.2004 
 
 
 
Pictures I have taken inside and outside of the Ovacık Gold Mine: 
 
The Ovacık Village adjacent to the mine (mine can be seen in the background) 
 
 
 
The view of the mine from the parking lot 
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Seminar room and the education center of the mine 
 
 
 
 
The outside view of the mine  
 
 
 
The open pit of the mine 
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The tailings storage facility 
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